

Hence, the analogy provided is dissimilar.<sup>32</sup>

उच्यते न, मार्गान्तरत्वात् । यद्यत्रास्ति तत्र तदर्थमुपादीयते इति पूर्वं भवताऽतिसृष्टम् । इदानीं त्ववगमविगमार्थं सतोप्युपादानमिति ब्रूवतो मार्गान्तरगमनं पूर्ववादत्यागोऽनैकान्तिकस्य चापरिहार इति । यत्पुनरेकुक्तं परिणामाद्युपपत्तेरदोष इति तथा तदस्तु । यत्कृतं मार्गान्तरानुपपत्तेरिति अत्र ब्रूमः— एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? परिणामाधर्मानवबोधत्वात् । सतो धर्मान्तरस्य निरोधमसत्तत्त्वोत्पत्तिं परिणाममभिदधतो व्यक्तमयमुपालम्भः स्यात् । न त्वनयानुसृत्या प्रतिष्ठामहे । किं तर्हि साधनानुगृहीतस्य धर्मिणो धर्मान्तरस्याविर्भावः पूर्वस्य च तिरोभावः परिणामः । न चाविर्भावतिरोभावावुत्पत्तिनिरोधौ । व्यूहसंश्लेषव्यक्तिप्रचयास्तु किमसतो धर्मा उत स्वतो सन्त इति विचार्यम् । किं चातः ? यदि तावदसतो धर्माः यथा कस्येति वाच्यम् । अथ स्वयमसन्तः पश्चाद् भवन्ति तदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अनर्थान्तरत्वात् । सत्यर्थान्तरभावे प्रागसन्तः पश्चादुपलभ्यमानाः सत्कार्यवादं निराकुर्युः । स चैषामर्थान्तरभावो न प्रसिद्धः । तस्मात्किमत्रोत्पत्तम् ? ग्रहणाग्रहणविकल्पे चोक्तः परिहारः । किं चान्यत् । द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिव्याघातात् । उपेत्य वैषामुत्पत्तिं ब्रूमः— यदि हि परिणामव्यूहसंश्लेषव्यक्तिप्रचयमात्रं कार्यमिष्यते यदुक्तं द्रव्याणि द्रव्यान्तरमारभन्त इति तस्य व्याघातः । कस्मात् ? न ह्येते भावा द्रव्यान्तरम् । तस्माद् दिनकरकिरणप्रतापमूर्च्छितस्येव दावाग्न्युपसर्पणदोषोनुतापायैव भवतः प्रतिपत्तिः ।

Proponent: *No, because the way adopted by you here is different from the earlier one.* Earlier you granted that the object is not selected for the production of the other which already exists in it. And, now speaking of selection of even the existing effect for the sake of the appearance and the disappearance you are not free from the defects of going out of the way, abandoning the theory held earlier and not alleviating the non-decisiveness. As regards the statement that it is faultless because of the possibility of justification of modification, etc., we say, let it be so.<sup>33</sup> As regards your argument that there is no impossibility of some other way out, we reply that this is also wrong.

Why?

Because you have not fully understood the characteristic of modification. This would explicitly be an objection against the one who speaks of modification as the destruction of existent characteristic and the production of the non-existent one. We do not, however, establish our theory following this maxim. On the contrary, modification is the disappearance of the earlier qualities and the appearance of other qualities in the objects affected by the instruments. And, the

appearance and the disappearance do not mean production and destruction. It should be considered whether the formation, joining together, manifestation and collecting together are the qualities, of some non-existent entity or they are non-existent in himself (earlier).

What is the use of it?

If they are the qualities of some non-existent, to whom will they belong? If they are the qualities of some non-existent earlier and come into existence (afterwards), it would also be wrong.

Why?

Because they are not different (independent) objects. They could set aside the theory of pre-existence of the effect if they would have been independent objects and would have been non-existent earlier and would have come into existence afterwards. Their nature of being independent object is not established. What, then, is produced? As regards the objection based upon the alternatives regarding their cognition and absence of cognition, the alleviation has been already put forward. *Moreover, it would contradict the maxim of production of the different substance.* Or, granting their production, we reply if formation, joining together, manifestation and collecting the earlier statement that substance gives rise to other substance.<sup>34</sup>

Why?

Because the states are not the independent substance. Hence, your (defective) understanding leads you to trouble just as the fault of resorting to the forest conflagration by a person who is deluded (or fainted) by the radiance of the rays of the sun, is certainly to lead him to trouble.

(usage of 'born' does not go against pre-existence of effect)

एतेनारम्भोपरमोत्पत्त्यविशेषप्रसङ्गो जन्मसच्छब्दः प्रत्युक्तः । कथम् ? आत्मभूतं हि तन्तूनां पटाख्यं व्यूहस्थानीयं सन्निवेशविशेषं यदा कारकाणि स्वेन स्वेन व्यापारेणाविष्कुर्वन्ति तदा क्रियते उत्पद्यते जायत इत्येवमादिर्लोकस्य व्यवहारः प्रवर्तते । यदा तु कारकाणि शक्त्यन्तराविर्भावात्संस्थानान्तरेणौत्सुक्यवर्तितामवस्थामुपसंहरन्ति तदा प्रागुपलब्धं संस्थानं विनाशशब्दाव्याच्यतां प्रतिपद्यते । परमार्थतस्तु न कस्यचिदुत्पादोऽस्ति न विनाशः यत्सुनरेतदुक्तं जन्मशब्दः प्रागभूतस्यार्थस्य भावोपक्रममाहेति तदपीच्छामात्रम् । कस्मात् ? विवादात् । सदसद्विषयं जन्मेति विवादेऽनुषक्ते जन्मशब्दः प्रागभूतस्य सद्भावमाचष्ट इति ब्रूवतोऽनुक्तसम्मम् । पुरुषादावदृष्टत्वादसिद्धिरिति चेत् स्यादेतत् यदि तर्हि क्रियते उत्पद्यते जायत इत्येषोर्थः सद्विषयः कल्प्यते, प्रधानपुरुषयोरपि तत्प्रसंगः, सदसदविशेषादिति । अतश्च विवादावस्थमेवैतत्प्रकरणमिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? संस्थानविषयत्वात् । यदा भावः स्वतोऽनर्थान्तर-

भूतं संस्थानं भजते तदैते शब्दाः प्रवर्तन्त इत्युक्तम् । दृष्टं च लोके तद्यथा मुष्टिप्रन्थिकुण्डलानि करोति जनयत्युत्पादयति, अभिव्यक्तात्मसु च मूलोदकादिषु भवत्युत्पन्नं जातमिति । उभयपक्षप्रसिद्धे तु शशविषाणादौ नैते शब्दाः प्रवर्तन्ते । तस्माद् भवत एवानिष्टप्रसङ्ग इति । उक्तं च

यद्यसत्त्वं घटादीनाममुत्पत्तौ हेतुरिच्छते ।

शशशृङ्गेऽपि तुल्यत्वादुत्पत्तिस्ते प्रसज्यते ॥

इति सिद्धं सत्कार्यम् ।

By this only it is also refuted that the term 'birth' or 'existence' involves the undesirable contingency of beginning, cessation from existence and a particular production.

How?

When the instruments bring forth through their activity the particular arrangement of the kind of particular form which is the very form of threads and is called cloth, people start the worldly usage as (the cloth) 'is made', or 'is produced' or 'is born'. And when the instrument takes away through the other arrangement brought out by the manifestation of other capacity the (earlier) state presented through curiosity, then the arrangement available earlier comes to be conveyed by the term destruction. In reality, there is neither origination nor destruction of anything. That what is stated earlier that the word origination means commencement for coming into existence of the object which was not in existence earlier, is also a mere wishful thinking.

Why?

*Because there is the controversy.* When the controversy is attached with (centred around) the fact that the origination refers to existence or non-existence, the statement that origination denotes coming into existence of the non-existent object is equal to a non-statement. If it is argued that it is non-established because it is not observed in case of conscious entity, etc.? It may be like this. If the object which 'is created', 'is produced' and 'originates' is postulated to be the existent object, it would involve the undesirable contingency of application of them to the cosmic matter and the conscious entity as well, because they do not fall outside the domain of existent and non-existent categories of objects. Therefore, the topic is controversial.

This is also wrong.

Why?

*Because they refer to the particular arrangement.* It is already stated when some object attains the arrangement which is not dif-

ferent form, itself, then only these words apply. It is observed in the wordly dealings also as he makes, brings forth or produces first (clenched hand), knot or the ear ring; in case of water or root which are manifested, it is used 'becomes,' 'is produced' or 'is born'. These words are not used in case of horns of the hare, etc., well known to both the parties. Therefore, the undersirable contingency arises in your case only. It is stated also.

If non-existence is desired to be the cause in the production of the pot, etc., it involves the undesirable contingency of production of horn of the hare in your theory because it (non-existence) is common in both the cases.<sup>35</sup>

Hence is proved the pre-existence of the effect in the cause.

(Efficient cause gives rise to efficient effect)

इतरच सत्कार्यम् ।

**शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्**

शक्यमिदमस्य, शक्तश्चायमस्येत्ययं नियमः सतां दृष्टः । तद्यथा चक्षुषो रूपस्य । अस्ति चायं पटस्य वेमादीनां च नियमः । तस्माच्च सत्कार्यम् । सहकारिवतन्नियम इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् यथापो बीजाङ्कुरस्योपतौ समर्था भवन्ति न काष्ठादग्नेर्वा । उभयं च ततासु च विद्यते । बीजादपां विच्छिन्नत्वात् । यथा च सूर्यः सूर्यकान्तादग्निमुत्पादयितुं समर्थो न चन्द्रकान्ताच्च पानीयम् । उभयं तत्र न विद्यते । तथा च तत्वादीनां पटस्यैव शक्तिनियमः स्यात् । न च पटस्य तन्तुषु सत्त्वं स्यादिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? साध्यत्वात् । अंकुरादयोऽपि कार्यमबादीनाम् । अतः साध्यम् । किमङ्कुरोस्त्यथ नास्त्येव । तथा सूर्यकान्तेग्निः । तदर्थमेव चायं विवादोऽनुषक्तः । यत्तुक्तमपां विच्छिन्नत्वात् तास्वङ्कुरोस्तीति तत्रापि यासामपां बीजानुप्रवेशदङ्कुरभावेन विपरिणामस्ताभ्यस्तस्यानन्यत्वं साध्यम् । अतो न किञ्चिदेतत् । किं चान्यत् । रूपव्यवस्थानाच्च । तद्यथा रूपं विज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वे सति न रूपं दृष्टमिति नेदानीं तत्सामान्यात् रूपमप्यरूपं भवति । एवं पटकारणत्वाद्देमादयो न पट इति नेदानीं तन्तवोप्यपटः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतच्छक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्सत्कार्यम् ।

The theory of the pre-existence of effect is proved through the following reason also.

**BECAUSE THE EFFICIENT CAUSE CAN GIVE RISE TO EFFICIENT (EFFECT) ONLY.**

The rule that this is efficient to be produced from it or this is efficient to produce is observed in case of the existent objects only. For example, the restriction of the eye to the form. This rule does

exist in case of cloth and the loom, etc. Therefore, the effect pre-exists in the cause. If it is argued that the rule can be explained on the analogy of assisting causes? It may be like this. The water, for example, is capable in producing sprout from the seed only and not from the wood or the fire. Both of them do not exist in water, because the water is different from seed. And, just as the sun is capable to produce fire from sun-stone and not the water from moon-stone. Both of them (fire and water) do not exist there. In the same way, there could be the restriction of the efficiency of the threads for the cloth only. There may not be the existence of the cloth in the threads.

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because these (example) are still to be proved. The sprout, etc., are also the effect of water, etc. Therefore, it is still to be proved whether the sprout pre-exists or not (in the water). Similarly, whether the fire pre-exists in the sun-stone or not (is yet to be proved). For that purpose only the controversy is raised. As regards your statement that the sprout does not exist in water because they are different, there also the difference of the sprout from the water which modify in the form of the sprout by entering into the seed is yet to be proved.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, this argument is nothing. *Moreover, because of the settled rule regarding the form.* For example, even though the form is the cause of the rise of knowledge, when the form is not perceived, then because of the commonness (of the non-preception) the form does not cease to be the form. Similarly, the fact that the loom, etc., are the cause of the cloth but not the cloth itself,<sup>37</sup> does not prove that the threads also are not the cloth. Therefore, it is right that the effect pre-exists because of the rise of an efficient effect from the efficient cause.

(Usage of cause proves pre-existence of effect)

**कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम् ॥९॥**

इहासति कार्ये कारणभावो नास्ति । तद्यथा वन्ध्यायाः । अस्ति चेह कारणभावस्तन्तुपटयोस्तस्मात्सत्कार्यम् । कारणान्तरात्कार्योत्पत्तिदर्शनादन्यत्र तद्बुद्धिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतं प्राक्कारणान्तरात्कार्यान्तरस्यासत् उत्पत्तिमुपलभ्य पश्चात्कारणान्तरे कारणबुद्धिर्भवतीति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अनभ्युपगमात् । असत्ः कार्यस्योत्पत्तिरेव न सिद्धा शशविषाणादिष्वसिद्धत्वात् । कुतः पुनस्तन्निमित्ताकारबुद्धिः ? कारणभावादिति चेत्— स्यादेतत्, असत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि पटस्य कारणं समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तलक्षणमस्ति । तस्मात्पट उच्यते, न शशविषाणस्येति ।

एतच्चायुक्तम् । कुतः हेत्वभावात् । असत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि पटस्य कारणमस्ति न शशविषाण-  
स्येत्यत्र हेतुरनुक्तः । पुरुषवदिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, यथा तुल्यत्वे सत्त्वे पटस्य कारणमस्ति न पुरु-  
षस्य, एवमसत्त्वे पटस्य संस्थानं न शशविषाणस्येत्येतदप्ययुक्तम् कस्मात् ? उक्तत्वात् । संस्-  
थानं कार्यं पटस्य । संस्थानं न पुरुषस्येत्युक्तं प्राक् । संस्थानवत्तद्विशेष इति चेत् स्यान्मतं  
यथा सत्त्वाविशेषे पटः संस्थानं न पुरुष एवमसत्त्वाविशेषे पटः कार्यं न शशविषाणमिति ।  
एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? सामान्यविशेषभावात् । सामान्यस्य हि विशेषपरिग्रहः संस्थानम् ।  
न त्वयमस्ति चेतनाशक्तौ विकल्पः । तस्मान् पुरुषः संस्थानम् । असतस्तु निरात्मकत्वाद्वि-  
शेषो दुरुपपादः । तदुपपत्तौ वा सत्त्वप्रसंग इति । आह च—

निरात्मकत्वादसतां सर्वेषामविशिष्टता ।

विशेषणं चेद् भिन्नं ते सत्त्वमभ्युपगम्यताम् ॥

तस्माद्युक्तमेतत्कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम् । एवं तावद्वैशेषिकमतेनासत्कार्यवादो न  
विमर्दसहः ।

## AND BECAUSE OF ITS (CAUSE'S) BEING THE CAUSE, THE EFFECT PRE-EXISTS.

In the word, the state of being a cause is not found in the ab-  
sence of the effect. For example, there is no state of cause in case of a  
barron woman. There is the state of cause for the cloth in case of the  
threads. Hence, the pre-existence of the effect.

It may be argued that the sense of being a cause arises in case  
of other cause after observing the production of effect from some  
other causes (i.e., another similar cause elsewhere). After observing  
the production of a non-existent and non-identical effect from  
another cause there arises the sense of cause in case of another cause  
afterwards.

This is also wrong.

Why?

*Because it is not accepted.* The production itself of a non-exis-  
tent effect is not established because it is disproved in case of hare's  
horn, etc. How can, then, there arise the notion of their cause?

It may be argued that it is on account of being the cause. To ex-  
plain, even though the non-existence is common, the cloth has got in-  
timate, non-intimate and efficient causes. Therefore, it is called cloth  
and they are not in case of the horn of hare.

This is also wrong.

Why?

*Because of the absence of reason.* The reason as even though the non-existence is common, why the cloth has the cause and the horn of the hare does not—is not stated.

If it is argued that it may be like the Purusa ? It may be like this. Just as the cloth has the cause but not the conscious entity even though the existence is common to both; similarly, the cloth has got the cause but not the horn of the hare even though the non-existence is common to both.

This is also wrong.

why ?

Because of the reason already stated. The effect in the case of cloth is the arrangement. The arrangement is not found in the conscious entity.

If it is argued that the difference may be like arrangement ? It may be like this. Just as even though the existence is common, the cloth is the particular arrangement and not the conscious entity; similarly, even though non-existence is common, the cloth is an effect and not the horn of the hare.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because there is the absence of generality and particularity (in the conscious entity).* The arrangement is the assuming of a particular form by the general form. This alternative is not found in the case of conscious entity. Therefore, the conscious entity is not subjected to particular arrangement. The particularity is impossible to be established in case of the non-existent object which has no nature at all. The establishment of that would lead to the undesirable contingency of its being existent. It is stated also :

All the non-existent objects have no particularity because they have no nature of their own. If there is a particularity, they become different (from each other). You should, in that case, accept their existence.

Therefore, It is right that the effect pre-exists because of the notion of cause. In this way, the theory of non-pre-existence of effect as held by the Vaiśeṣikas does not stand in the encounter.

( Buddhist theory of non-existence of composite criticised )

बौद्धपक्षे तु भूयान्दोषः । कथं तर्हि द्रव्यान्तरं पटो नेष्यते ? "तन्तुष्वेव तथास्थेषु पट इत्यादिबुद्ध्यः" इत्येवमादिना न्यायेनावयवप्रतिषेधात्संयोगोऽपि न संयोगिभ्यस्तेषामर्थान्त-

रमिष्टः । तत्रैतावती परिकल्पना स्यात्— यदुत तन्तुसंयोगो वा पटः, संयोगकारणं वा द्रव्यान्तरम् ? उभयं च तेषां नार्थान्तरम् । अथोत्पत्तिविनाशौ कस्यापीति मायाकारचेष्टितम् । तदपि चित्रतरोऽयमुपन्यासः । काणादानां तु द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिविनाशाभ्युपगमान् तार्किकसदृशो विचारः । तस्मात्पारमर्ष एव पक्षो ज्यायान् । यथा चासत्कार्यं न संभवति तथा चशब्दात्सदसत्कार्यमपि ।

In the theory of the Buddhists<sup>38</sup> there are many defects. Why is then the cloth not accepted as different substance? On account of the rejection of the composite on the basis of the maxim 'the notion of cloth, etc., is in the threads arranged in that form, the conjunction is also not accepted as different element form the conjunct objects', The imagination may be like this. Whether the cloth is the conjunction of the threads or some other substance is the cause of conjunction? Both of these, however, in their theory, are not different substances, Hence, the origination and destruction are the acts in the form of illusion.

This view is rather more strange. On account of accepting the origination and destruction as belonging to some different substance, the view of the followers of kaṇāda is not similar to that of the logicians (Buddists).<sup>39</sup> Therefore, the view of the great seer only is better.

#### (Criticism of jain view)

परस्परविरोधात् नैव सन्नासदिति एके । एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सत्त्वे हेत्वभिधानान्निश्चितः प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सद्भावः ॥ ९ ॥

As there is no possibility of the non-existent effect; similarly, (there is no possibility of) effect as existent and non-existent simultaneously through the word *ca* (in the *kārikā*).<sup>40</sup> Some people hold that on account of mutual contradiction the effect is neither existent nor non-existent (before origination). This is wrong.

Why?

Since the reasons are adduced in the favour of existence, the existence of the effect earlier to its origination is certain.

## KĀRIKĀ 9

1. Change is the very nature of the constituents. In the state of dissolution, however, there is no virupaparinama leading to creation of the universe, though they are not devoid of sarupaparinama.
2. The context demands the reading paramavibhaga... in place of paramavibhaga.
3. The universe is nothing but a collected form of the constituents in different quantity.
4. It further suggests that the constituents are the material as well as the instrumental cause of the universe. There is no external instrumental cause to activate them for creation.
5. I.e., when the material cause itself modifies into the effect, there is no room for postulating the origination of something new.
6. Here, we prefer the reading asiddhenarthantarasiddheh as found in Poona manuscript which conveys the sense of the reading siddhenarthantasiddheh accepted by Chakravarti.
7. The horn of the hare is non-existent like the horn of the crow and, hence, there is no propriety in arguing for the existence of one on the basis of the other. In fact, something established is resorted to do establish the other.
8. Here we prefer the reading asambhavat as found in Poona manuscript in place of anupalabdhi asambhavat accepted by Pandeya.
9. The sense is that the causes of non-perception of even an existent object enumerated in the 8th karika do not apply here.
10. Malatilatagandhena should be read as malatilata gandhena. There is no purpose in joining them.
11. According to the satkarya theory of the Samkhyas that which exists cannot absolutely disappear and nothing absolutely new takes place. In the present case, however, the earlier existing qualities disappear and new are introduced. It does not, therefore, fit in the theory of the Samkhyas.
12. The cloth placed on the threads is observed as different, but it is not the case with its own components. Hence, there is no ground to know the differentiation between the two. The cloth, in the theory of the Samkhyas, is the particular arranged form of the threads.

13. The meaning is that the argument is based upon two presuppositions that the composite is different from the components and that there is the relation of inherence between them. The Samkhyas do not accept even the first on which the second is based.
14. The meaning is that the material cause is different from the instrumental in the sense that the former gets modified in the form of the effect while the latter serves as an external instrumental cause.
15. Just as the loom, etc., are not always invariably concomitant with the effect, the same will be the case with the threads if the causal status of the loom, etc., and that of the threads is considered to be the same.
16. The context demands the reading *bhedanamagrahanat...* in place of *bhedanam grahanat.....*
17. Two-ness cannot be known without observing the two objects at one time.
18. If it is held that the composite exists in the collection of all the components, it would not be cognised with the perception of a single object out of all the components. Consequently, with the perception of horns the knowledge of cow cannot take place. Here, the context demands the reading *go'agrahana.....*
19. If the composite is supposed to pervade all its components, existing in all of them separately, it would be manifold like components themselves.
20. The meaning is that the corporeal objects are non-pervasive (*avyapyavrtti*) in nature and thus cannot occupy the same place.
21. Here, elephant and tree are not different from army and forest respectively.
22. The pronoun 'these' stands for the above mentioned compounds. The reading marked to be doubtful by Pandeya could possibly be *canarthantarate.....*
23. It is because the Samkhya teachers visualised the effect existing in its causal form.
24. The sense is that it is wrong to consider action, properties, etc., as the probans for the inference of the substance.
25. *Karanam* is more suitable to the context than *Karanam*.

26. As stated above, the substance, according to the Naiyayika, is that which is endowed with action, attribute and name.
27. The sense is that if the effect is supposed to be unrelated to the instrumental causes, it would not stand in need of causal operation.
28. From the Nyaya standpoint the instrumental causes like loom, etc., are selected for the production of cloth. These are different from cloth. Similarly, the material causes like threads, etc., are also selected for the production of cloth and, hence, they should also be treated as different.
29. The sense is that the effect will be equally different from all the causes. Due to the common characteristic of difference any effect would come out of any cause.
30. The context demands full stop after *prasangacca*.
31. These examples prove that the effect exists in the object which is selected for its production. Hence, the reason that the effect is different from the causes selected for its production, involves the defect of non-conclusiveness. Actually the effect differs from its instrumental causes and not from the material causes. The above reason, however, treats both kinds of reasons at par and consequently involves defects.
32. In the above examples the so called effect is directly observed while such is not the case with the cloth.
33. It refers to the Samkhya reply postulated against the futility of the agents, etc. The agents, etc., are not futile since they bring about the characteristics of transformation, joining together, manifestation and collecting together.
34. Gf. *Vaisesikasutra* 1.1.8
35. Such words are not spoken with reference to the absolutely non-existent objects like horn of the hare.
36. The reading *tasyanyatvam* as found in Poona manuscript is preferable to *tasyananyatvam* as accepted by Pandeya.
37. We prefer the reading *samanyavisesabhavat* as given in Poona manuscript and adopted by Chakravarti to Pandey's reading *samanyavisesabhavat*.
38. According to the Buddhists the composite does not exist apart from the components.

39. The word tarkika should be taken in the sense of the Buddhists here because the Vaisesika theory of causation which is not different from that of the naiyayikas is listed separately and consequently the word tarkika should not be taken in the usual sense of the Naiyayikas.
40. The author means that through the force of the word *ca* in the Karika the theory that the effect is both existent and non-existent is refuted. It may be the reference to the theory of Jaina thinker.

## KĀRIKĀ 10

प्रकृतमिदानीं वक्ष्यामः । किं च प्रकृतम् ? महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं चेति वचनाद्वैरूप्यम् ।

Now we shall speak on the subject under discussion.

And, what is the subject under discussion?

It is the dissimilarity conveyed through the statement 'and its effects like intellect and the rest are dissimilar and similar to the cosmic matter'.<sup>1</sup>

(Cause of mentioning dissimilarity first)

आह— प्राक्सारूप्यग्रहणं, सुखप्रतिपत्तिहेतुत्वात् । अधिगतसारूप्यस्य हि सुखं वैरूप्यस्य प्रतिपत्तिर्भवतीति प्राक्सारूप्यग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । यथा तन्त्रान्तरीयाणां सदमित्यं द्रव्यवत्कार्यं कारणं सामान्यविशेषवदिति द्रव्यगुणकर्मणामविशेषसामान्यमुक्त्वा द्रव्याणि द्रव्यान्तरमारभन्ते गुणाश्च गुणान्तरमित्येवमादिः विशेषोऽभिधीयते ।

Opponent: The similarity should be discussed first because it makes understanding easy. The similarity should be undertaken first because the knowledge of dissimilarity arises easily in case of the one who has understood the similarity. As the other systematists (Vaiśeṣikas) after mentioning the general qualities common to all the substance, quality and action that they are existent, non-eternal, related to the substance, (in the form of the intimate cause), effects, causes and are possessed of the general and particular qualities, state their particularities that the substance gives rise to substance and the quality to the other quality.<sup>2</sup>

उच्यते— तदनुपपत्तिः । अविशेषात् । यथैवाधिगतसारूप्यस्य लघीयसी वैरूप्यप्रतिपत्तिरेवमधिगतवैरूप्यस्य लघीयसी सारूप्यप्रतिपत्तिः । कस्मात् ? परस्परापेक्षत्वात् । वैरूप्यापेक्षं हि सारूप्यं, सारूप्यापेक्षं च वैरूप्यमिति ।

Proponent: It is not correct because it makes no difference. Just as the knowledge of dissimilarity is easier for the one who has known

the similarity, the knowledge of similarity becomes easier for the one who has known the dissimilarity.

Why?

*Because of their mutual dependence.* The similarity depends upon dissimilarity and the dissimilarity, upon similarity.

आह— एवमपि वैरूप्यस्य प्रागभिधाने प्रयोजनवचनम् । द्वयोरविशेषेऽन्यतरस्य प्रागभिधाने नियमहेतुर्वक्तव्य इति ।

Opponent: In this case also the purpose of stating the dissimilarity first should be mentioned. When there is no difference between the two, the restrictive cause of mentioning the one first should be stated.

उच्यते न, वैरूप्यस्य प्रकरणानङ्गभावत् । विच्छिन्नं हि वैरूप्यमतस्तत्पूर्वमभिधाय प्रकरणाङ्गं सारूप्यं सुखमभिधातुमित्येवमर्थमाचार्येणैवं क्रियते । कथं सारूप्यस्य प्रकरणाङ्गत्वमिति चेत् त्रैगुण्याभिधानद्वारेण गुणलक्षणोपदेशात् । तत्सिद्धौ चाविवेक्यादीनां व्यक्तसिद्धेः कारणगुणात्मकत्वाच्च कार्यस्य प्रधाने त्रैगुण्यादिप्रतिपत्तेः, कार्यकारणभावासन्देहाच्च प्रधानास्तित्वप्रसिद्ध्यपदेशात्तत्सिद्धौ च भोग्यस्य भोक्त्रपेक्षत्वात् पुरुषसिद्धेरधिगतभोक्तृभोग्यस्य तत्संयोगस्य च सुखप्रतिपाद्यत्वात्तदर्थ्याच्च तत्त्वभूतभावसर्गाणाम् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत्प्रकरणाङ्गत्वात्सारूप्यं पञ्चान्निर्दिश्यते । तदसम्बन्धादितरत्रागिति ।

Proponent : *No, because the dissimilarity does not form the part of the subject under discussion.* The authority has done so because the dissimilarity is out of the context and, therefore, after stating it first, it becomes easy to state the similarity which forms the part of the subject under discussion.

How does the similarity form the part of the subject under discussion?

Because the characteristics of the constituents are taught through the description of the objects composed of the three constituents.<sup>3</sup> When that is established, the non-discriminative nature comes to be established in case of manifest,<sup>4</sup> and since the effect is of the nature of the cause, the qualities like composed of three constituents, etc., are understood in the case of cosmic matter as well. And, when the doubt about the relation of cause and effect is dispelled and when the cosmic matter is proved to exist through the reason proving the existence of the cosmic matter, the existence of the conscious entity is proved since the object of enjoyment stands in

need of some enjoyer. So also because the contact of the two is easily comprehended by one who has understood the nature of experiencer and the objects experienced and because the creation of the elements, beings and the mental dispositions is meant for the conscious entity (the existence of the conscious entity is proved). Therefore, it is correct that the similarity will be discussed later because it forms the part of the subject under discussion. The other (viz., dissimilarity will be discussed) first because it is not related to that (i.e., the subject under discussion).

आह—यदि तर्हि भवान्नागवैरूप्याभिधानं न्याय्यं मन्यते तद्वक्तव्यं किं पुनरिदं वैरूप्यमिति ।

Opponent: If you think it proper to discuss the dissimilarity first, you should state what is the dissimilarity in the present case.

(Dissimilarity between cosmic matter and its evolutes)

उच्यते—

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।

सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

तत्र हेतुः कारणमित्यनर्थान्तरम् । तदस्यास्तीति हेतुमत् । नित्यं ध्रुवम् । न नित्यमनित्यम् । व्याप्नोतीति व्यापि । न व्याप्यव्यापि । असर्वगतमित्यर्थः । सह क्रियया सक्रियम् । अनेकं भिन्नम् । आश्रितमाधेयम् । लिङ्गं तल्लक्षणोपपन्नम् । अवयूयन्त इत्यवयवाः । पृथगुपलभ्यन्त इत्यर्थः । सहावयवैः सावयवम् । परतन्त्रमन्याधीनम् । एते हेतुमदादयः परतन्त्रान्ता निरपवादाः व्यक्तस्यासाधारणाः प्रधानपुरुषाभ्यां धर्माः ।

Proponent: THE MANIFEST IS HAVING A CAUSE, NON-ETERNAL, NON-PERVASIVE, ACTIVE, MANIFOLD, LOCATED, INFERENTIAL MARK, CONJUNCT AND DEPENDENT ; THE UNMANIFEST IS OPPOSITE TO IT.

Here, the term *hetu* (cause) is synonymous of *kāraṇa* (cause).<sup>5</sup> *Hetumat* denotes that which has a cause. Eternal is everlasting. Non-eternal is opposite to eternal. Pervasive is that which pervades. Non-pervasive is that which is not pervasive. The sense is that it is not having access everywhere. Active is that which has activity. Manifold is varied. Located is supported. The inferential mark means that which is endowed with the characteristics of that. The components are those which are joined. The sense is that (they) are found separately. Conjunct is that which possesses the components. Dependent means supported by some other object. These charac-

teristics beginning with caused and ending with dependent are without controversy the (peculiar) characteristics of the manifest not found in the cosmic matter and the conscious entity.

(Having a cause)

आह—हेतुमदित्यविशेषः सर्वत्र सद्भावात् । व्यक्ताव्यक्तपुरुषाणां हि सर्वेषां हेतुरस्तीति अविशेष एवायं पठितव्यः ।

Opponent: The quality of having a cause is not uncommon because it is present everywhere. The cause is found in the case of all the manifest, the unmanifest and the conscious entity, and hence, it should be listed as a common (characteristic).

उच्यते न, कारकपरिग्रहात् । यद्यपि व्यक्ताव्यक्तपुरुषाणामविशिष्टं हेतुमत्त्वं तथापि विशिष्टस्य कारकस्य हेतोः परिग्रहं करिष्यामः । स च व्यक्तस्यैव नान्यस्येति नायमविशेषो भविष्यति ।

Proponent: No, because the creating cause is accepted (here as a cause). The quality of having a cause is common to the manifest, unmanifest and conscious entity but we accept here the uncommon creating cause. That pertains only to the manifest and not to anyone else. Hence, it won't be common.

आह—तदनुपपत्तिः, विशेषानुपादानात् । हेतुरिति सामान्यशब्दोऽयम् । सामान्यशब्दाश्च नार्थप्रकरणशब्दान्तराभिसम्बन्धमन्तरेण विशेषेऽवतिष्ठन्त इति विशेष उपादेयः स्यात् । स तु नोपादीयते । तस्मात्ते अविशेषा एवेति ।

Opponent: That is wrong because there is no mention of this type of peculiar cause. Cause (*hetu*) is a general term and the general term is not used in some particular sense without (considering) the sense, context and the relation with other word, hence, the particularity should have been mentioned. That is, however, not mentioned here. Hence, those are common only.

उच्यते न, सर्वसम्भविनोऽभिधानस्य प्रकर्षार्थत्वात् । इह यः सर्वसंभवी धर्म एकविषय उपादीयते तस्मात्प्रकर्षो विज्ञायते । तद्यथा भोक्ता माणवक इत्युक्ते सर्वेषां भोक्तृत्वस्य संभवादेवं विज्ञायते प्रकर्षेणायं भोक्तेति, एवमिहापि सर्वसम्भवीत्याहाचार्यो व्यक्तं हेतुमदिति । तेन वयमस्मात्प्रकर्षं विज्ञास्यामः । कश्च प्रकर्षः ? कारकज्ञापकयोरुभयोरपि सम्भवे कारकस्यैव ग्रहणम् । अनित्यशब्दसम्बन्धाद्वा । अथवाऽयमाचार्यो हेतुमदित्युक्त्वाऽनित्यमिति पठति । शब्दान्तराभिसम्बन्धात् । योऽनित्यसहचरो हेतुस्तस्येह ग्रहणं गम्यते ।

कश्चाऽनित्यसहचरो हेतुः ? कारकः ।

Proponent: *No, because the statement of something applicable to all when applied to one, gives special meaning.* Here, the speciality is known from the statement of a quality which though applicable to all is mentioned with reference to one object only. For example, when it is stated that the lad is an eater, it is understood that he eats too much because eating is possible in case of all. Similarly, here also the authority states that the manifest is having a cause, a statement applicable to all. Therefore, we will understand speciality from it.

What is the speciality?

When there is the possibility of both types of cause, viz., producer (*Kārikā*) and indicator (*jñāpaka*), the producer cause is accepted here. *Or because of the connection with the word non-eternal.* Or, after mentioning the word *hetumat* (having a cause) the authority mentions the word non-eternal (*anitya*). On account of the connection with the other word it is understood here that only the cause which invariably associates with non-eternity should be accepted.<sup>6</sup>

What is the cause which invariably associates with non-eternity? That cause is the producer.

आह एवमप्यनुपपन्नमेतत् । कस्मात् ? उभयत्र तत्संभवात् । उत्पाद्यव्यङ्गययोर्हि विनाशं पटादिषु दृष्ट्वात् अव्यभिचारात्तन्त्रान्तरीया मन्यन्ते । तस्य वा परिहारो वक्तव्यः न वा वक्तव्यो विशेषे स्थितिस्तीति ।

Opponent: Even understood like this, it is wrong.

Why?

*Because that is possible in both the cases?* The other systematists hold so because of the non-violation of the rule since in the case of objects like cloth, whether produced or manifested, the destruction is surely observed. It should be alleviated, or it should not be held that it is applicable to something particular.

उच्यते न, एकान्तवादप्रसङ्गात् । सर्वेण हि वादिनाऽवशयं किञ्चिन्नत्यमभ्युपगन्त्वम् । अन्ततोविनाशोऽपि न कश्चिदर्थः शब्दबुद्धिभ्यां न व्यज्यते । तथा सत्येकान्तवादोऽयं स्यात् । स च युक्तिमदिभर्नेष्यते । तथा च संस्कृतमप्येवं कल्प्यमाने विनाशि स्यात् । तस्मादुत्पाद्यव्यङ्गययोर्विनाशं ब्रुवतोऽतिसाहसम् ।

Proponent: No, because it would lead to the undesirable contingency