

YUKTIDĪPIKĀ

VOL. II

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PROLOGUE

The system of Sāṃkhya is honoured in the ancient Indian literature and is considered to be an important system by the opponents of Sāṃkhya. The other systems have utilised the theories of Sāṃkhya in the course of their development. The *Yuktidīpikā* (= *YD*) serves as a decisive testimony for it. Basically, Sāṃkhya stands for the highest knowledge attained through intensive deliberation. It is derived from the word *sāṃkhyā* which is in turn derived from *saṃ* + $\sqrt{\text{kyā}}$. It comes to mean number or philosophical investigation. The system of Sāṃkhya explains the facts of experience through enumeration of categories and also culminates into the highest knowledge. In spite of its great antiquity it has suffered a lot for the gaps in literary continuity and finally is so much overpowered by other systems that no powerful author undertook the task of its defence from the onslaught of other systems. Its origin is oblivious and the pre-systematised form of it available in the references to it in the ancient literature suggests its rich tradition. It was considered necessary for all intellectuals and thinkers. The other systems with their stress on different specialised aspects invited the attention of the later thinkers interested in particular aspects and the Sāṃkhya giving a general framework was reduced to the position of the opponent in the development of many doctrines.

The earliest authentic work on Sāṃkhya available to us is the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. This text, however, systematises the theories of Sāṃkhya in such a brief that its import cannot be understood without a detailed commentary on it. The *YD* is the earliest commentary to satisfy this need. The other commentaries like *Māṅgalya*, *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, *Jayamaṅgalā* and the

Sāṃkhyacandrikā, etc., are very brief and, hence, are not sufficient to provide the details required for the understanding of the Sāṃkhya system. The *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra is the only commentary which explains the kārikās of Īśvarakṛṣṇa in detail. The *Y D*, however, excels over it in many respects. Since it was not available for a very long time to the scholars of Sāṃkhya, its importance has not been fully realised.

The *Y D* adopts a most comprehensive approach to the kārikās as containing aphoristic statements and justifies it with all possible details. It regards the *Sāṃkhyakārikās* as containing all the excellences of a complete philosophical text, such as aphorisms, means of knowledge, components, completeness, statement of uncertainty and decisiveness, brief enunciation, detailed statement, succession, naming the objects and advice. It illustrates all these elements in the text of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.¹ Moreover, its approach to the wording of the kārikās is quite critical and analytical. It suggests amendment in the kārikās as in 28th that the reading should be *śabdādiṣu* instead of originally found *rūpādiṣu* terming the latter as reading adopted through carelessness. In this case, it can be rightly termed a *vārttika*. It justifies its another name as *Rājavārttika*. The propriety of such a name will be discussed later on.

Here, the author resorts to the grammatical rules to discuss the wording of the kārikās. He analyses the problem of compound in the expression *tadapaghātaka*.² The author gives the etymological meaning of the technical terms to justify their use by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The technical terms are used to expound the nature of the object denoted. The author of the *Y D* believes that the technical terms were coined by the *ācāryas* after having realised the nature of the objects. Thus, the author of the *Y D* explains *pradhāna* as the resorting place of all the evolutes (at the time of dissolution) and

1. *Y D* on *Kārikā I*.

2. *Ibid*.

puruṣa as the entity which rests in the body.³ The later followers of these *ācāryas* use the same terms as these terms were enough to serve the purpose of the intended meaning.

The *YD* justifies not only the reading of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* but also the contents of the Sāṅkhya system. Such a purpose is served in two ways. It is the only text which saves the system of Sāṅkhya from the intellectual onslaught at the hands of the other systems. The Sāṅkhya system has been severely criticised by the other systems. There is no other existing text than the *YD* which undertakes the issue of defending the Sāṅkhya doctrine from such a criticism. Secondly, the *YD* adopts the method of criticising the theories of other systems also to justify the position of the system of Sāṅkhya. Such a unique approach makes the *YD* essential for the complete understanding of Sāṅkhya. Sometimes the text enters into so minute details that it becomes difficult to make out the statement of the opponent or of the Sāṅkhya. The *YD* does not leave the topic until it squeezes no more out of it. The author spares no argument to justify the tenets of Sāṅkhya. The name *Yuktidīpikā* is given with the same background. It is illuminator of (all possible) reasoning (to justify the system of *Īśvara-kṛṣṇa*). The *YD* recognises that such a task of refuting the contention of the opponents was shouldered by the authors of Sāṅkhya before *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* also. The controversy had become so subtle that its import could not be grasped easily.

तेषामिच्छाविघातार्थमाचार्यैः सूक्ष्मबुद्धिभिः ।

रचिता स्वेषु तन्त्रेषु विषमास्तकंगह्वराः ॥

Since such a purpose was not carried on by *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* or his followers, the *YD* undertakes the continuation of the same intelle-

3. प्रयत्नतो भगवतः परमर्षेण ज्ञानेन सर्वतत्त्वानां स्वरूपमुपलभ्य संज्ञां विदधतो नास्ति स्वरूपनिबन्धनः शब्दः । तद्यथा प्रधीयन्तेऽत्र विकारा इति प्रधानम्, पुरि शेते इति पुरुष इत्यादि ।

ctual warfare with the other systems. The appellation *Yuktidīpikā* also suggests the same as the author considers the text as proposing to dispel the darkness of the wrong doctrines through the light of reasoning by the noble persons of unconfused mind.⁴ Thus, as the light serves twofold purpose of removing the darkness and revealing the objects, the *YD* also serves twofold purpose of discarding the opponent's stand and of throwing light on the doctrines of Sāṃkhya in a true perspective. It may casually be observed that *P. B. Chakravarti*⁵ thinks that the *YD* proposes to reply to the hostile criticism of the *Paramāthasaptati* of Vasubandhu. Such a restriction, however, ignores the statement about various opponents of Sāṃkhya as

प्रतिपक्षाः पुनस्तस्य पुरुषेशाणुवादिनः ।

वैनाशिकाः प्राकृतिका विकारपुरुषास्तथा ॥

The author recognises in the introduction of the text that the *YD* proposes to expound the Sāṃkhyakārikā with an intention of justifying it with all possible arguments :

तस्य व्याख्यां करिष्यामि यथान्वायोपपत्तये ।

कारुण्यादप्ययुक्तां तां प्रतिगृह्णन्तु सूरयः ॥

This was also a practical need of the time. Īśvarakṛṣṇa wrote the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* without making the reference to the stories as also the theories of other systems.⁶ The controversy between the Sāṃkhya and the other systems could not be grasped without having the knowledge of the doctrines of Sāṃkhya. Such a purpose was served by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. He expounded the Sāṃkhya doctrines along with their technical details. He himself recognises that the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is a summary of the text called *Ṣaṣṭitantra* which dealt with

4. *YD* on kārikā 72

5. *Origin and development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, p. 160.

6. *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 72

sixty topics.⁷ The *YD* enumerates these sixty topics as existence of the cosmic matter, singleness, purposefulness, distinction, subservience, plurality, disunion, union, duration, lack of agency (forming the basic topics); and the fivefold error, nine kinds of contentment, twenty eight types of disability of organs, and eight types of attainment. *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* deals with all these topics in his own way in very brief. Hence, the *YD* is an attempt to explain the *kārikās* in a right perspective.

The unique feature of the text which raises it to the height of importance is the reference to the views of pre-*Īśvarakṛṣṇa* *Sāṃkhya* teachers, the works of whom are lost to us. The *YD* is the only source to have a glimpse of various schools in the *Sāṃkhya* itself before the advent of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* during the gaps in its literary continuity. It mentions that the seers like *Pañcaśikha* experienced the existence of effect in the cause.⁹ *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* followed thoroughly the views of *Pañcaśikha*. According to *Pañcādhikaraṇa* the sense-organs are elemental in nature¹⁰ and ten in number.¹¹ Being elemental in nature these cannot function of their own. They are compared to the dry rivers and can operate only with the influx of the *Prakṛti*.¹² Regarding the transmigration of the subtle body, *Pañcādhikaraṇa* holds that the subtle body enters the organs of the father and the mother at the time of their intercourse and gets

7. *Ibid.*

8. प्रधानास्त्वमेकत्वमर्थतत्त्वमथान्यता ।

पारार्थ्यञ्च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥

शेषवृत्ति रक्तृत्वं चूलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।

विपर्यय पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥

करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।

इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टाभिः सह सिद्धिभिः ॥

9. *YD* on *kārikā* 9

10. *YD* on *kārikā* 22

11. *YD* on *kārikā* 32

12. *Ibid.*

merged into the semen and blood of the father and mother and grows in the womb.¹³ The *YD* records the views of Patañjali also in various contexts. He believes that the sensation of I is by the intellect itself and, hence, he rejects the separate existence of egoism. The organs are, therefore, twelve in number according to him.¹⁴ The senses operate of their own without any external influx. Patañjali holds a peculiar view about the subtle body and the transmigration. The subtle bodies, according to him, are many. These subtle bodies vary in each birth. It helps in uniting the organs to the womb suitable to the past impressions of acts. Having pushed the organs to the heaven or the place of torture, it vanishes. A new subtle body is produced which takes the organs to the womb and vanishes. Again, a new subtle body is produced which continues up to death.¹⁶ The *YD* criticises Paurika's view of multiplicity of the Prakṛti. According to Paurika, there is a separate Prakṛti assigned to each Puruṣa. It creates the body, etc., for that particular Puruṣa. The activity and desisting from activity of this particular Prakṛti is governed by those attached to the divine personalities. When the Prakṛtis of the divine personalities create, or the Prakṛtis attached to divine personalities desist from activities, the others also do so.¹⁷ The *YD* refers to the views of Vārṣaganya who defines perception as the functioning of the sense-organs, ear and the rest.¹⁸ The manifest world deviates from its derived form and not from its existence at the time of dissolution.¹⁹ The Puruṣa imitates the intellect existing as knowledge when commingled with the functioning of the intellect.²⁰ Vārṣaganya along with the other

13. *YD* on kārikā 39

14. *YD* on kārikā 32

15. *YD* on kārikā 22

16. *YD* on kārika 39

17. *YD* on kārikā 56

18. *YD* on kārikā 5

19. *YD* on kārikā 10

20. *YD* on kārikā 17

authorities does not subscribe to the view that some other element comes out of Prakṛti out of which the intellect comes forth.²¹ To illustrate the unprompted spontaneous activity of the Prakṛti Vārṣaganya holds that the Prakṛti proceeds to activity as the insentient bodies of man and woman proceed towards each other (for sexual intercourse).²² Vārṣaganya has beautifully explained the mutual relation of three constituents. One of them dominates the other two. Still there is no mutual contradiction between the dominant and the dominated. Those having intensity in form and function contradict, while the ordinary ones co-operate the dominants.²³ Unlike all other authorities Vārṣaganya holds that the subtle elements are not of a single form.²⁴ Vindhyavāsin is an important teacher specially for explaining the theory of knowledge. Unlike other authorities he holds that the egoism and the five subtle elements are produced from the intellect. Thus, the bifurcation into the elemental and psychological aspects takes place in the products of egoism according to others, while it happens so in the products of intellect according to Vindhyavāsin.²⁵ The sense-organs, according to him, are located at eleven points and are all-pervasive in nature. Unlike all other teachers, he holds that the knowledge of all the objects arises in mind. Vindhyavāsin does not feel the need of admitting the subtle body. He holds that the same organs are all-pervasive and the attainment of the state of their functioning is birth while its abandonment is death.²⁶ As regards the classification of the dispositions, Vindhyavāsin rejects the classification of natural (*prakṛta*) dispositions into three—*tattvasama* (arising in the intellect at the very time of its production), *sāmsiddhika* (existing innately in a composite body but requiring a

21. *Y D* on kārikā 22

22. *Y D* on kārikā 57

23. *Y D* on kārikā 13

24. *Y D* on kārikā 22

25. *Ibid*

26. *Ibid*

stimulus). Vindhyavāsin holds that the dispositions cannot be *tattvasama* and *sāmsiddhika*. They require the stimulus for their manifestation and, consequently, are of the nature of accomplished. That is why the knowledge in lord Kapila was manifested after hearing from the teacher.²⁸ Besides, there is a reference to many doctrines of other systems which require deep consideration separately.

The *YD* classifies the text into four Prakaraṇas and eleven āhnikas. Such a division is not observed in any other commentary of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*.

The authorship of the *YD* has posed a complicated problem still unsolved. The crux of the problem lies in the mention of Vācaspati Miśra as the author of the *YD* in the colophon at the end of the manuscript as also the mention of some Rājā, the assumption of which is gathered from the statements of Jayantabhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī*.²⁹ The admittance of Vācaspati Miśra's authorship of the *YD* involves a lot of valid objections. Firstly, the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra does not show any sign that he has already written a commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. If it is presumed that he wrote it after the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī*, we do not understand the need of writing the two commentaries on the same at the hands of the author like Vācaspati Miśra. Secondly, there are some differences of interpretation of the kārikās in the *YD* and the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī*, which hinder the assumption of admitting the same author of the two. Thirdly, the style of the two is so different that one cannot accept the same author of the two when read side by side. Fourthly, there are ample evidences to prove that the *YD* was written long before Vācaspati Miśra. The difference between them is not less than a century according to

27. *YD* on kārikā 39

28. *YD* on kārikā 42

29. *Nyāyamañjarī* p. 100, Varanasi 1936

*P. B. Chakravarti*³⁰ while *R. C. Pandey*³¹ puts forward three proofs in favour of the existence of the Y D long before Vācaspati Miśra. (1) The Y D quotes the definition of perception offered by Dinnāga while Vācaspati Miśra refutes the Dharmakīrti's revised definition of the same. (2) Vācaspati Miśra quotes three verses towards the end of the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* from a text named *Rājavārttika*. These verses occur in the beginning of the Y D. (iii) While refuting Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition of perception, Jayantabhaṭṭa refers to the elucidation of the same by some Rājā. A similar statement is found in the Y D. Since Jayantabhaṭṭa is a contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra, the Y D must be earlier to him. To discard the authority of the mention of Vācaspati Miśra's name in the colophon, *R. C. Pandey* considers it an error on the part of the scribe. The authority of the second and the third argument leads us to assume that *Rājavārttika* is another name of the Y D and its author was some Kājā respectively. The author of the Y D, however, nowhere names his work as the *Rājavārttika*. It must have been given by someone else. It is certainly a work of vārttika class and resembles to a certain extent to the *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara, though the latter is a vārttika on the *Bhāṣya* while the earlier is a vārttika on the kārikās treating them as sūtras. The addition of the term *rāja* in the beginning begs justification. It may be assumed that it was called *Rājavārttika* because it is the most eminent explanation of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, or, because it was written by some person known as Rājā. The latter finds support from the statement of Jayantabhaṭṭa. There is no decisive evidence to identify that Rājā with the famous kind Bhoja or Bhartṛhari. *R. C. Pandey*³² feels that the identification of Rājā with Bhoja is too naive, and is prompted by the tendency of attributing any good thing to Bhoja and to identify any *rājā* with Bhoja.

30. *Origin and Development of Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, p. 161.

31. Introduction to the Y D p. xv

32. *Ibid.*, p. xiv

It is equally difficult to find out the date of the YD. In this regard we find no definite proof and, therefore, have to be satisfied with mere conjectures. P. B. Chakravarti thinks that its upper limit cannot be before Bhartṛhari (first half of the seventh century) as the author quotes some couplets which are found in the *Vākya-pāḍīya* with slight variation.³³ R. C. Pandey feels that since the YD quotes the definition of perception offered by Dinnāga, the upper limit is the advent of Dinnāga. There is, however, no satisfactory criterion to decide the lower limit of the date of the YD. On the basis of the style of the text and different authorities quoted therein P. B. Chakravarti is inclined to think that it cannot be put later than the eighth century A. D.³⁵ The style of the text, however, leads one to think that it may be contemporary of Uddyotakara.

It is interesting to note that the author of the YD spares no argument in his fierce intellectual warfare with others in defence of Sāṃkhya. This turns the style of the author highly polemical. Generally the opponent's views are presented with *āha* and the reply with *ucyate*. But, even having raised a *pūrvapakṣa* the author raises some plausible reply and then the plausible objection with these words and it becomes difficult to analyse where the views of the opponents begin and where the reply to it ends. One is lost in the arguments of attacking, counter attacking and re-attacking continuously till the final conclusion is reached. This difficulty led the translators to arrange the text in a different manner. For the same reason it was felt useful to give the Sanskrit text also. In presenting the Sanskrit text we have consulted three available editions—by P. B. Chakravarti, (Calcutta,

33. *op. cit*

34. *op. cit*

35. *op. cit*

1938), by *R. C. Pandeya* (Delhi, 1967) and by *Ramashankar Tripathi* (Varanasi, 1970).

The herculean task of translating the YD was undertaken in 1976 and was completed within a couple of years. However, it could not be placed before the readers until the work of its publication was shouldered by Shri Sham Lal Malhotra, Prop., Eastern Book Linkers, Delhi. The translators are thankful to him. The next part is expected to see the light of the day soon.

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KĀRIKĀ-9

(objections against pre-existence of effect in the cause)

आह- आस्तां तावद्वैरूप्यसारूप्यचिन्ता । कार्यमिदमेव तावन्महदादि परीक्षिष्यामहे । किं प्रागुत्पत्तेरस्ति नास्तीति ? कुतः संशय इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्- असङ्गतार्थं प्रकरणान्तरमुपक्षिप्यते भवता । न चाविद्यमानसम्बन्धस्य संशयस्य प्रकरणान्तरेऽभिधीयमानस्य निर्णीतिं साध्वीमाचार्या मन्यन्ते । अवकाशाऽसम्भवादिति ।

opponent : Let us stop for the time being the consideration of dissimilarity and similarity. We shall first examine the effects like intellect and the rest as to whether the effect exists earlier to its manifestation or not.

If it is asked why does the doubt arise? It may be like this. You are introducing another irrelevant topic. The authorities do not consider it right to consider a doubt which is not connected and is stated indirectly in connection with some other topic because there is no possibility of its scope.

उच्यते- अस्ति संशयावकाशः । कस्मात् ? आचार्यविप्रतिपत्तेः । प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यमसदित्याचार्याः कणादाक्षपादप्रभृतयो मन्यन्ते । सदसदिति बौद्धाः । नैव सत्रासदित्यन्ये । तस्मादुपपन्नः संशयः ।

Proponent : There is certainly the scope for the doubt.

Why?

Because there is the difference of opinion among the authorities. The authorities Like Kaṇāda and Gautama hold that the effect is non-existent before its origination. The Buddhists hold that it is both existent and non-existent. The others hold that it is neither existent nor non-existent. Therefore, the doubt is justified.

तत्रेदानीं भवतः का प्रतिपत्तिरिति ?

Opponent : In that case, what is your opinion?

उच्यते ।

नाऽविद्यमानस्य महदादेर्विकारस्य प्रधानादाविर्भाव इति प्रतिजानीमहे ।

कस्मात् ? सन्निवेशविशेषमात्राभ्युपगमात् । न हि नः कारणादर्थान्तरभूतं कार्यमुत्पद्यत इत्यभ्युपगमः ? किं तर्हि विश्वात्मकानां सत्त्वरजस्तमसामगतविशेषाविशेषाः सम्मात्रलक्षणोपचयाः प्रतिनिवृत्तपरिणामव्यापाराः परमविभागमुपसंप्राप्ताः सूक्ष्माः शक्तयः । तासामधिकारसामर्थ्यादुपजातपरिणामव्यापाराणां सम्मात्रानुक्रमेण प्रचयमुपसंपद्यमानानां सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रं व्यक्तम् । एतस्यां कल्पनायामसत उत्पत्तौ कः प्रसङ्ग इति ? एतेनैव बाह्यानां तन्त्वादिकार्याणां पटादीनां सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रत्वादसत उत्पत्तिः प्रतिषिद्धा बोद्धव्या ।

Proponent: We accept that the effects like intellect which would not exist in the cosmic matter, would not arise.

Why?

Because we accept only a particular arrangement (to be the effect). We do not hold that there originates an effect which is altogether different from its cause. On the contrary, the sattva, rajas and tamas which form the essential nature of the world are endowed with the subtle potencies (in the state of unmanifest) which are devoid of similar or the dissimilar differentia, in an accumulated form having the characteristics of existence only, desist from the activity of modifying themselves (into the universe)¹ and in their entirety (lit. unpartitioned in the form of various effects).² The manifest is merely the particular arrangement of the potencies in whom the activity leading to modification has arisen due to their being entitled for it³ (or due to the acts of living beings) and which have attained a collected⁴ form in the orderly succession of their mere existence.⁵ When this sort of supposition is accepted, where is the occasion for the origination of the non-existent? By this only the origination of non-existent should be understood to be refuted in the case of the external objects like cloth, etc., the effects of the threads, etc., because of their being merely the particular arrangement (of their respective material cause).

आह—अविद्यमानमेतत् । कस्मात् ? असिद्धे, नार्थान्तरसिद्धेः । यदि हि सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रत्वं कार्यस्य सिद्धं स्यादत एतद्युज्यते वक्तुम्—तदभ्युपगमादसदुत्पत्तेरप्रसङ्ग इति । तत्त्वसिद्धम् । द्रव्यान्तरभूतस्यावयविनो निष्पत्तिर्प्रतिज्ञानात् । तस्मात् काकविषाणात् शशविषाणसिद्धिवदयुक्तं सन्निवेशविशेषमात्राभ्युपगमात्सत्कार्यसिद्धिरिति ।

Opponent : The reason is false (lit. non-applicable).

Why?

Because it is not established. The object cannot be established (through the other unestablished object). Had it been established that the effect is the mere particular arrangement (of the cause), only

then it would have been proper to say that because of the acceptance of this position there is no occasion for the origination of the non-existent. This is, however, not established because we have declared the origination of the composite as different from the components. Therefore, the establishment of the prior existence of the effect through the acceptance of the particular arrangement (in case of the effect) is improper like the establishment of the horn of the hare through the horn of the crow.⁷

इतश्चासत् कार्यम्, अग्रहणात् । इह श्रोत्रादीनां विषयभूतस्य तत्सन्निधानादवश्यं ग्रहणेन भवितव्यम् । यदि च प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत्कार्यं स्यात् तदपि श्रोत्रादिसन्निधानात् गृह्येत । न तु गृह्यते । तस्मादसत्कार्यम् ।

Moreover, the effect is non-existent (in the cause) because it is not perceived. There must arise the knowledge of the object of the senses like ear, etc., as it (the object) is into the contact of the senses. If the effect were existent before its origination, it would also be perceived as it comes into the contact with the senses like the ear, etc. However, it is not perceived and, therefore, the effect is non-existent (before its origination).

अनुपलब्धिकारणसद्भावादिति चेत्, तत्रैतत्स्यात्, अस्ति प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्यानुपलब्धिकारणं तस्मादस्य सतोऽप्यग्रहणं भवति । उत्तरकालं तद्विगमात् ग्रहणमिति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनुपलब्ध्यसम्भवात् । तद्धि प्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वे सत्यतिदूरादिभिरनुपलब्धिकारणैर्नोपलभ्यते । न चैषां तत्र सम्भवः । तस्मादसदेतत् । कारणान्तरानभिधानात् । न चाऽतिदूरादिव्यतिरिक्तमनुपलब्धौ कारणान्तरमधीध्वे यतोऽस्याग्रहणं स्यात् । अतश्चासदेव । किं चान्यत् कारणानुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । अनुपलब्धिकारणासद्भावात्कार्यस्याग्रहणमिच्छतः कारणाग्रहणप्रसङ्गः । कस्मात् ? अभिन्नदेशत्वात् । एकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् स्थूलत्वाच्च । तत्त्वनिष्ठम् । तस्मादयुक्तमनुपलब्धिकारणसद्भावात्सतः कार्यस्याग्रहणमिति । प्रमाणान्तरनिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गादयुक्तमिति चेत्, स्यादेतत् यदि तर्हि प्रत्यक्षविषयमेवास्ति । ततोऽन्यत्रास्तीत्येदुपगम्यते । तेनातीन्द्रियविषयस्यानुमानस्य निवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्मान्नानुपलब्धेरसत्कार्यमिति । एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? क्रियागुणव्यपदेशासम्भवात् । यद्धि प्रत्यक्षतो नोपलभ्यते तत्क्रिययास्तीति संसूच्यते । यथा हर्म्यावस्थितानां तृणानामुद्ग्रहनाद्वायुः गुणेन, यथा मालती-लतागन्धेन व्यपदेशेन वा, कार्यादिना यथेन्द्रियाणि । न तु प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य क्रियागुणव्यपदेशासम्भवः तस्मादसत्कार्यम् ।

It may be argued that it is so (not perceived) on account of the (other) causes of its non-perception? It may be like this. There is the cause of the non-perception of the effect before its origination. Therefore, it is not perceived even though it exists. Later on it is perceived on account of the removal of that (cause of non-perception).

It is also not proper.

Why?

Because there is no possibility.⁸ It may be like this. That kind of object is not perceived, but still, its non-perception is caused by the causes of non-perception like extreme distance, etc. There is (however,) no possibility of these in that case.⁹ Therefore, the effect is non-existent. Moreover, because of the non-mention of some other cause, you have not recognised some cause other than extreme distance, etc., due to which it may not be perceived. Hence, it is non-existent. Moreover, due to the undesirable contingency of non-perception of the cause. In case of the one who intends the absence of the knowledge of the effect on account of the presence of the cause of non-perception, there arises the undesirable contingency of non-perception of the cause.

Why?

Because they are located at the same place, are perceived through the same sense and are gross (i.e., not subtle or minute). This is, however, undesirable. Therefore, it is not proper to say that the effect is not perceived due to the cause of non-perception even though it exists.

If it is argued that the argument is wrong because it involves the undesirable contingency of refusal of the other means of knowledge? It may be if it is held to be the object of perception only; it is admitted (through it) that there is no other means (to cognise). This involves the undesirable contingency of the refusal of inference which is the means of cognising the non-perceptible objects. This is, however, undesirable. Therefore, the effect is not non-existent because of its non-perception.

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because there is no possibility of activity, property or name. The objects not cognised through perception are inferred through their activity just as the air is indicated by its activity of lifting up of the straws lying in the court-yard; through property—just as the jasmine creeper is indicated by its smell;¹⁰ or through the name. It is indicated through result as the sense, etc. There is no possibility of activity, property and name in case of the effect before its origination. Therefore, the effect is non-existent.

इतश्चासत्कार्यम् । कर्तृत्रयासाफल्यात् । इह प्राग् व्यापारोपक्रमात् कर्तारस्तस्मात्फ-

लमुपलिप्समानाः कार्यविशेषनियतसामर्थ्यं साधनमुपादाय व्याप्रियन्ते । तच्चेत्प्रागपि व्यापारात् स्यात्तदर्थस्य परिस्पन्दस्यानर्थक्यं प्राप्तम् । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्मात् कर्तृप्रयाससाफल्यात् असत्कार्यम् । परिणामाद्युपपत्तेर्न दोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतं कारणस्य परिणामव्यूहसंश्लेषव्यक्तिप्रचयलक्षणान्धर्मान् यस्मात् कर्त्रादीनि कुर्वन्ति नानर्थकानि स्युः । सत्त्वं च कार्यस्य न निरुगते । क एवं सति दोषः स्यादिति ? उच्यते— न शक्यमेवं कल्पयितुम् । कस्मात् ? मार्गान्तरानुपपत्तेः । परिणामो हि नामावस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य धर्मान्तरनिवृत्तिः धर्मान्तरप्रवृत्तिश्च । तत्र सतो धर्मान्तरस्य निरोधाभ्युपगमादसतश्चोत्पत्तिप्रतिज्ञानान्नेदमर्थान्तरमारभ्यते । एवं व्यूहादयोऽप्युपसंहर्तव्याः । तस्मात् परिणामादिभिरभिभवात् कर्त्रादीनामर्थवत्त्वादसत्कार्यम् । तथा चोक्तम्—

जहद् धर्मान्तरं पूर्वमुपादत्ते यदा परम् ।
तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो धर्मो परिणामः स उच्यते ॥

Moreover, because of the success in the effort of the agent. Here, it is observed that the agents with the desire of getting the fruit with that (cause) acquire before the commencement of the operation the particular means having the capability of producing a particular effect and employ them in operation. If that (fruit) would exist even before the causal operation, the operation meant for that purpose will serve no purpose. This is, however, not desirable. Therefore, because of the success of the operation of the agent the effect is non-existent.

If it is argued that this defect does not arise because of the possibility of the transformation, etc.? It may be like this. The agent, etc., would not be useless because they bring about the characteristics of the cause like transformation, structure, joining together, manifestation (or visibility) and increase in the cause. The existence of the effect is not contradicted. When this is the position, what would be the fault?

It is not possible to postulate like this.

Why?

Because of the impropriety of some other way out. The transformation is, in fact, the giving up of some qualities and introduction of some new qualities in the already existing object. In that case, because of the giving up of some existing qualities and the origination of some other non-existing qualities there is (no) production of some different object. Similarly, the structure, etc.,¹¹ should also be summed up. Therefore, on account of the dominance by the transformation, etc., and the significance of agent, etc., the effect is held to be non-existent. It is stated also:

When an object takes over new properties giving up the earlier but without deviating from its essential nature, that is called transformation.

कुतश्च न सत्कार्यम् ? आरम्भोपरमयोराद्यन्ताविशेषप्रसंगात् । यदि सत्कार्यं स्यात् तेन यः क्रियार्थः साधनानामादौ परिस्पन्दः सोऽन्तेऽपि स्यात् । वा योऽन्ते विरामः स आदावपि स्यात् । कस्मात् ? सदविशेषात् । न तु तदस्ति । तस्मादसत्कार्यम् ।

And, why does the effect not exist?

Because there would arise the undesirable contingency of the non-difference between the beginning and the stopping of the commencement and the cessation. If the effect would be existent, the operation of the instruments employed for the activity at the commencement would be found at the end also. Or, the cessation (of the operation) found at the end would be present at the commencement as well.

Why?

Because there is no differentiation with regard to the existence of the effect (at both the stages). This is not the case. Therefore, the effect does not exist.

इतश्चासत्कार्यम् उत्पत्तिधर्मस्याद्यन्तयोरविशेषप्रसङ्गात् । यदि सत्कार्यं स्यात् तेन यथा निष्पन्नस्योत्पत्तिधर्मेणाभिसम्बन्धः तथा आदावपि स्यात् । यथैवादावभिसम्बन्धः तथाऽन्तेऽपि स्यात् । दृष्टस्त्वभिसम्बन्धो नाभिसम्बन्धश्चाद्यन्तयोः । तस्मादसत्कार्यम् ।

Here is another reason for the non-existence of the effect. There would arise the undesirable contingency of the non-difference between the states of commencement and that of the stopping in the case of (the relation of) the quality of origination. If the effect would be existent, the quality of origination would be related to the object in the beginning also in a way it is related to the accomplished state. The type of relation with the origination found in the beginning would be found at the end also. The relation and the non-relation (of the quality of origination) is, however, experienced at the state of commencement and the end respectively. Therefore, the effect does not exist.

इतश्चतासत्कार्यम् । जन्मसच्छब्दयोर्विरोधात् । इह जन्मशब्दः प्रागभूतस्यार्थस्य भावक्रममाह । सच्छब्दस्तु क्रियान्तरहेतुत्वमाह । यदि सतो जन्म स्यादैकार्थ्यमनयोः स्यात् । न त्वेतदस्ति । तस्मादयुक्तं सज्जायत इति ।

Here is another reason for the non-existence of the effect. Because there is the contradiction between the two terms-origination

and the existent. The word origination (janana) denotes the coming into existence of an object which does not exist earlier. The term existent (sat) denotes the instrumentation of some other action. If the existent would be subject to origination, both the terms would become synonymous. It is, however, not the case. Therefore, it is improper to say that the existent originates.

(Non-difference between a composite and the components)

उच्यते—यदुक्तं द्रव्यान्तरभूतस्यावयविनो निष्पत्तिप्रतिज्ञानात्र सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रत्वात् सत्कार्यमित्यत्र ब्रूमः—तदसिद्धिः, भेदेनाऽग्रहणात् । यदि तन्त्वादिभ्यो द्रव्यान्तरभूतस्यावयविनो निष्पत्तिः स्यात् तेन यथा तन्तुकलापे पटस्तत्रैव वा पटान्तरमाहितं भेदेनोपलभ्यते तथैवोपलभ्येत । न तूपलभ्यते । तस्मात् न द्रव्यान्तरम् ।

Proponent : As regards your argument that since we have declared that the composite is produced as different from the components, the effect does not pre-exist on account of its being different from the particular arrangement of the cause, we reply as follows. The reason does not hold good at all because it is not known as different. If there would have been the origination of some altogether different composite out of the threads, the cloth would be observed as different just as it is observed so when it is placed in the collection of threads or just like another cloth placed there. It is, however, not observed thus. Hence, it is not something different.¹²

समवायादग्रहणमिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, संयोगिनोर्द्रव्ययोः सत्याधाराधेयभावे भेदेन ग्रहणं भवति । समवायलक्षणा तु प्राप्तिस्तन्तुपटयोः । तस्मान्नास्ति भेदेन ग्रहणमिति ।

If it is argued that it is not found (as different) due to the relation of inherence? It may be like this. The two substances related through conjunction (samnyoga) and consequently there being the relation of located and the location, are cognised as different. The relation between the threads and the cloth, however, is that of inherence (samavaya). Therefore, they are not cognised as different.

तच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? असिद्धत्वात् । सिद्धे सत्यर्थान्तरभावेऽवयविनस्तत्त्वाप्तौ च समवाये सर्वमेतत्स्यात् । तत्त्वसिद्धमुभयम् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । किंचान्यत् दृष्टान्ताभावात् । महापरिमाणं द्रव्यमन्यत्राहितं समवायात् भेदेन नोपलभ्यते इत्येतस्मिन्नर्थे पर्यनुयुक्तस्य कस्ते दृष्टान्तः ? न चास्त्यनुदाहृतो वादः ।

This argument is, however, improper.

Why?

Because it is not proved. Only after proving the composite as different object (than the components) and the relation of inherence between them, all this would be said. Both of these are, however, unproved.¹³ Hence, your argument is wrong. Moreover, it is wrong on account of the lack of example also. To prove that substance of big magnitude put at some other substance is not cognised to be different due to the relation of inherence, what example can be cited by you in case an enquiry is made from you? The discussion without an example is not discussion at all.

व्याप्ते न ग्रहणमिति चेत् स्यान्मतमकार्यकारणभूतं द्रव्यं सत्यपि सम्बन्धे न द्रव्यान्तरं व्यश्नुत इत्यतो भेदेन गृह्यते । तन्तुपटयोस्तु कार्यकारणभूतत्वात् व्याप्तिः । तस्मान्नास्ति भेदेन ग्रहणमिति ।

If it is argued that the difference is not cognised between the composite and the components on account of their pervasion? It may be like this. The substance is cognised as different from the substance which is neither its cause nor its effect because one does not pervade the other even though they are mutually related. There is the mutual pervasion between the threads and the cloth because they are related through causality (or because there is the cause-effect relation between them). Therefore, they are not cognised as different.

एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? साध्यत्वात् । सत्यर्थान्तरभावेऽवयविद्रव्यान्तरवत् कार्यकारणभावः साध्यः समवायश्च । अत इयं व्याप्तिः स्यात् । सा चाप्रसिद्धा इत्यतो न सम्यगेतत् ।

This is also improper.

Why?

Because this is to be established. Here, the causal relation and the inherence are yet to be established just as it was to be proved that the composite is different substance. Then only there can be the mutual pervasion. This is, however, not well known. Therefore, your argument is not proper.

वेमादिवत् इति चेत् स्यादेतत्—यथा सत्यर्थान्तरभावे वेमादयोऽवयविनः कारणम् एवं तन्तवोऽपि ।

If it is argued that it may be like loom, etc.? Just as the loom, etc., are the cause of the composite even though they are different, similar may be the case with threads, etc.

एतदनपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनभ्युपगमात् । करणं वेमादयः पटस्य न कारणमित्यय-

मभ्युपगमो नः । तस्मात् विषयोऽयं दृष्टान्तः । किं चान्यत् । तद्ददव्याप्तिप्रसङ्गात् । वेमादिव-
दर्थान्तरं पटात्तन्तव इत्येवं ब्रुवतस्तदवदव्याप्तिप्रसङ्गः । किं चान्यत् । स्पर्शक्रियामूर्तिगुरुत्वा-
न्तरवतस्तद्वति प्रतीघातादिति । इह स्पर्शान्तरवति स्पर्शान्तरवत्प्रतीघातो दृष्टः । तद्यथा घट-
स्याश्मनि । स्पर्शान्तरवांश्च ते पटस्तन्तुभ्य इत्यतोऽस्य तदव्यापित्वमयुक्तम् । एवं च क्रिया-
दयो वक्तव्याः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् भेदानां ग्रहणान्नावयवी द्रव्यान्तरमिति ।

This is wrong?

Why?

Because it is not accepted by us. Our theory is that the loom, etc., are the instruments for the cloth and not the material causes. Hence, the illustration is odd.¹⁴ Moreover, there would be the undesirable contingency of absence of mutual pervasion as in the case of those (loom, etc.).¹⁵ There would arise the undesirable contingency of absence of pervasion between the threads and the cloth as it is in the case of loom and the cloth, in case of those who hold that the threads are different from the cloth, like loom, etc. Moreover, because the object is obstructed by the other object having different type of touch, activity, form and a weight. It is experienced that the object having different type of touch is obstructed by the other just as the pot is obstructed in the presence of a stone. The cloth is of a touch different from the threads. Hence, their mutual pervasion does not hold good. In this way activity, etc., should be explained. Hence, it is proper to say that the composite is not a different substance because differences are not cognised.¹⁶

इतश्च नावयवी द्रव्यान्तरम् । कृत्स्नैकदेशवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । स ह्यवयवेषु वर्तमानः कृत्स्नेषु
वा वर्तते प्रत्यवयवं वा ? किं चातः ? तन्न तावत् कृत्स्नेषु वर्तते । कस्मात् ? एकदेशग्रहणे
ग्रहणाभावप्रसङ्गात् । यदनेकेषु वर्तते तस्य कृत्स्नाधारग्रहणे सति ग्रहणं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा द्वित्वा-
दीनाम् । एवं च सति विषाणादिग्रहणे गोऽग्रहणप्रसङ्गः । किं चावयवानवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । स
ह्यवयवान् व्याप्नुवंस्तद्व्यतिरेकेणावयवान्तराभावात् केन व्याप्नुयात् ? अवयवान्तराभ्युपगमे
चानवस्थाप्रसङ्गः । कृत्स्नैकदेशवृत्तिप्रसङ्गश्च समानः । तस्मान्न सर्वेषु परिसमाप्यते, न प्रत्ये-
कमनेकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अनेकाधारपरिसमाप्तं ह्यनेकं रूपादि दृष्टमिति । किंचान्यत् शास्त्रहानेः ।
प्रत्यवयवं परिसमाप्तोऽवयवीत्येतदिच्छतो मूर्तिमताऽवयवेन समानदेशः स्यात् । ततश्च
यच्छास्त्रं मूर्तिमतामसमानदेशत्वमिति तस्य व्याघातोऽवयवपरिमाणं च प्राप्नोति । न महत्त्वा-
दिपरिसमाप्तत्वादेकद्रव्यं च प्राप्नोति । ततश्च यच्छास्त्रं द्रव्यमनेकद्रव्यमद्रव्यं वा तस्य हानिरे-
तावता चास्य वृत्तिर्भवन्ती भवेत् । सर्वथा च दोषः । तस्मान्नावयवी द्रव्यान्तरम् ।

Due to this reason also the composite is not a different substance. Because it is improper to hold their existence either in all the components or in every component part (separately). If it is present

in the components, it may be present in all the components or in the individual component (separately).

What does it prove?

It does not exist in all parts.

Why?

Because it will involve the undesirable contingency of its non-perception through the perception of a part. It is observed that whatever exists in many is cognised through conginging all of substrata; for example, the two-ness (*dvitva*), etc.¹⁷ In this case, there will arise the undesirable contingency of non-perception of cow through the perception of the horns, etc.¹⁸ Moreover, it would lead to the infinite regress in the case of the components. The composite pervades the components, but by whom the components will be pervaded because the (supposed) pervasiveness is not something different from the components? If the pervasive is admitted to be different, it will involve the undesirable contingency. The undesirable contingency in case of its existence in the composite and the parts is the same. Hence, it does not pervade all. Nor does it pervade each component because in that case it will involve the undesirable contingency of its being manifold.¹⁹ It is observed that the colour, etc., which pervade many substrata are many. Moreover, the scripture would be violated. The composite would have the same substratum as the components which is corporeal in nature, in the theory of one who intends (to establish) that the composite pervades each component. It will contradict the scriptural statement that the objects possessed of form do not have the same substrata.²⁰ And, it would also imply the magnitude of the component as that of the composite. It will not hold good with the idea that the composite is a single substance because it pervades the large magnitude. If this sort of existence is admitted in its case, the scriptural statement regarding substance, manifold or absence of substance will be violated because it involves the fault in all circumstances. Therefore, the composite is not a different substance.

अर्थान्तरावस्थानेऽर्थान्तरोत्पत्तिविनाशदर्शनादन्यत्वमिति चेत् स्यादेतत्-विद्यमानेषु तन्तुषु पटो न भवति संयोगलक्षणस्य कारणान्तरस्यानुत्पत्तेः। संयोगोत्तरकालं तु भवति। कारणसामग्र्या विद्यमानेष्वेव च तन्तुषु विनाशमुपयाति। विभागादर्थान्तरावस्थाने चार्थान्तरोत्पत्तिविनाशौ दृष्टौ। तद्यथा हिमवदवस्थाने दवाग्नेः। तस्मादर्थान्तरं पटस्तन्तुभ्य इति।

If it is argued that the two (composite and components) are different because the one is observed as being produced and

destroyed in the presence of the other? It may be like this. The cloth does not exist in the presence of the threads because the contact, the cause of the cloth, is not produced. And, the cloth comes into existence after the contact is produced (in the presence of the threads). The cloth gets destroyed even in the presence of the threads by the totality of causal conditions (of destruction). The origination and destruction of an object are differently observed in the presence of the other object on account of their difference. As for example, the forest conflagration (originates and gets destroyed) while the Himalaya (covered with snow which is opposed to fire) is present. Hence, the cloth is different from threads.

एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? साध्यत्वात् । साध्यं तावदेतत्—किमत्रार्थान्तरमुत्पद्यते विनश्यति वा ? आहोस्वित्तन्तुष्वेव समवस्थानविशेषापेक्षस्य पटाभिधानस्य प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती सेनावनवद् भवतः ? तस्मादेतदपि नावयविनो द्रव्यान्तरभावे लिङ्गम् ।

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because it is still to be proved. Whether that which originates and is destroyed is the different object or the activity (leading to origination) and withdrawal from activity (leading to destruction) belong to the cloth which is based upon the particular arrangement of the threads, as is the case with army (which is the collection of the soldiers) or the forest (which is the collection of the tress). This also does not serve as a probans in proving that the composite is a different object..

तत्पुरुषबहुब्रीहिद्वन्द्वसमासोपपत्तेरन्य इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, इहार्थान्तरत्वे सति तत्पुरुषो दृष्टः । तद्यथा राज्ञः पुरुषो राजपुरुष इति । बहुब्रीहिश्च चित्रगुः शबलगुः । द्वन्द्वश्च प्लक्षन्यग्रोधाविति । अस्ति चेहापि तत्पुरुषस्तन्तूनां पटः । बहुब्रीहिश्च दृढतन्तुः शुक्लतन्तुः । द्वन्द्वश्च तन्तुपटाविति । तस्माच्चावयव्यर्थान्तरम् ।

If it is argued that it should be held to be different for the propriety of the compounds like tatpuruṣa, bahubṛīhi and dvandva? It may be like this. It is observed that the tatpuruṣa is used in case of different objects just as the sense of the 'Man of the king' is conveyed through the term rājapuruṣa. Same is the case with the bahubṛīhi as found in the case of expression 'Who has spotted cows' or 'Who has brindledcows'. The similar is the case with dvandva as in plakṣa and nyagrodha (both meaning the fig tree). These compounds are observed to take place in the case of threads and the cloth also, tatpuruṣa - as in the expression cloth (made) of threads, bahubṛīhi - as in the expression (the cloth) 'that has strong threads' or the cloth '

that has white threads', the dvandva - as in the expression 'threads not the cloth'. Therefore, the composite is different (from the components).

एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अनेकान्तात् । अनन्यत्वेऽपि हि तत्पुरुषो दृष्टः । तद्यथा सेनागजः काननवृक्ष इति । बहुव्रीहिश्च वीरपुरुषा मत्तगजा सेना इति । द्वन्द्वस्तु यदि स्यात्सत्य-मेवार्थान्तरमवयवी स्यात् । न तु कश्चित्पटावस्थायामेवं प्रयुङ्क्ते-तन्तुपटवानयेति । तस्मान्ननोरथमात्रमेतत् । एतेन समाख्यासामर्थ्यभेदाः प्रत्युक्ताः । ते चापि चानर्थानत्वे सति सेना-दिषु दृष्टाः । तस्मान्नाऽवयवी द्रव्यान्तरम् । द्रव्यानतरभूतस्याऽवयविनो निष्पत्तिप्रतिज्ञानात्, न सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रत्वात् सत्कार्यमित्येतदयुक्तम् ।

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because it is non-conclusive. The tatpuruṣa is observed even when there is no difference in the expression like the elephant of the army and the tree of the forest.²¹ The bahubhr̥hi also (takes place) as in the expression an army which has brave men, and the army which has intoxicated elephants. If there would be the dvandva compound, the composite would really be different, (but) no one uses the expression bring the threads and the cloth in the state of the cloth. Therefore, it is only a wishful thinking. By this only the differences in the capacity of denotation are refuted. These also are observed in the case of (components of) army, etc., though there is no difference.²² Therefore, the composite is not different substance. Hence, it is wrong to argue that since the origination is observed in case of the composite which is different, the theory of pre-existence of effect cannot be proved on the basis of considering the composite as a particular arrangement (of the causes).

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तमनुपलब्धेरसत्कार्यमिति, अत्र ब्रूमः । एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? संश-यकारणत्वात् । स च सद्विषयाऽनुपलब्धिः । इत्येतस्मादेव हेतोस्सांशयिका वयम् । तामेव तु निश्चयार्थमवलम्बमानो न युक्तिमार्गमनुयाति ।

As regards your statement that the effect does not exist because it is not perceived (to be existent in the causes), we reply that it is also wrong.

Why?

Because it is doubtful. The non-perception in this case pertains to the already existent object. Because of this reason only we doubt. The argument taking that (non-perception of the non-existent) as certain does not stand before logic.²³

यत् पुनरेतदुक्तं कारणान्तराऽनभिधानादिति—एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अभि-
प्रायाऽनवबोधात् । यो हि यथा कुण्डे बदराण्यर्थान्तरभूतान्याहितानि तथा कारणे कार्यमस्ती-
त्येतदाचष्टे तं प्रत्ययमुपालम्भः स्यात् । वयन्तु अनेकशक्तधर्मिणः सहकारिशक्त्यनतरानुगु-
हीतस्य पूर्वस्याशक्तेस्तिरोभावमुत्तरस्याश्चाविर्भावमुपादधानाः कारणमेव कार्यमित्यनुमन्या-
महे । तयोस्तु शक्त्योर्युगपदग्रहणम् । इतरेतरप्रतिबन्धहेतुत्वात् । वस्त्रस्यायामविस्तारवत्,
कूर्माङ्गमिव द्रष्टव्यम् । यथा वस्त्रस्योपसंहारप्रतिबन्धादायामविस्तारौ न ग्रहणविषयतां प्रतिप-
द्येते, सत्तां वा न जिहीतः कूर्मस्येवाङ्गानि, तथा तन्त्वादीनामपि भावानां कारणाभिमता कार्या-
भिमता चावस्था क्रमेण वा स्थिरश्च भवत् तन्निमित्तस्तदग्रहणाऽग्रहणविकल्पः ।

Your argument that the effect does not exist because you have not put forward some other reason of non-perception (other than extreme distance, etc.,) is also wrong.

Why?

Because you have not understood the import of our statement. This censure is applicable to those who speak of the effect as placed in the cause just as the jujube fruit placed in a vessel (bowl-shaped). We hold that the effect is the cause itself which is endowed with various potencies and through the assistance of the other assisting potencies the earlier potencies of whom disappear and the later potencies manifest. Those potencies are not perceived simultaneously because they obstruct each other. It should be understood just as the stretching and expansion of the cloth or like the limbs of a tortoise. The stretching or the expansion of a cloth are not subjected to perception due to the obstruction of contracting and they do not deviate from the existence. The same is the case with the limbs of a tortoise. Similarly, the state of the threads, etc., called the cause or the effect comes to be fixed in sequence serving as the cause of that (object) and serves as the cause for the perception or the non-perception of that object.

एतेन कारणग्रहणं प्रत्युक्तम् । यदप्युक्तं प्रमाणान्तरनिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गादिति सत्यमेतत् ।
यत्तुक्तं क्रियागुणव्यपदेशासम्भवादानुमानाभाव इति तदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? पृथक्त्वाऽन-
भ्युपगमात् । कार्यकारणपृथक्त्ववादिनस्तत्क्रियागुणानां पृथक्त्वमनुमानात् युक्तमित्यतस्तन्व-
वस्थाने पटक्रियागुणग्रहणादानुमानाभाव इत्ययमुपालम्भः सावकाशः स्यात् । अस्माकन्तु
कारणमात्रस्यैव संघातादाकारान्तरपरिग्रहाद् वा क्रियागुणानां प्रचितिव्यक्तिविशेषो भवतीति
ब्रुवतामदोषः । व्यपदेशस्तु कार्यकारणपर्यायः । सोऽयुक्तः । कस्मात् ? अनेकान्तात् । द्रव्यगु-
णत्वकर्मत्वादीनां क्रियागुणकार्यकारणभावोऽथ च सत्वमिष्यते ऽथ लिङ्गपर्यायः । न तर्हि
वयं पर्यनुयोज्या व्यपदेशाभावादसत्कार्यमिति । किं कारणम् ? प्रकरणात् । विप्रतिपत्तौ हि
सत्यां लिङ्गतः प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य समधिगमं करिष्याम इति प्रकृतमेवैतत् । अनेकान्तिकत्वं च

समानम् । निष्पत्त्यनन्तरं द्रव्यस्यास्तित्वाभ्युपगमादगुणवतो द्रव्यस्य गुणारम्भः । कर्मगुणा अगुणा इति वचनादुत्पन्नमात्रं द्रव्यं निष्क्रियं निर्गुणमवतिष्ठते इति वः पक्षः । न चास्य तथाभू-
तस्य लिङ्गमस्ति । अथ चास्तित्वं भवद्भिरभ्युपगम्यते । सिद्धेर्ग्रहणात्सद्भाव इति चेत् । सर्व-
विवादसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । दृष्टान्तविरुद्धमर्थं प्रतिज्ञाय पतिषिध्यमानेन सिद्धबुद्धिविषयता स्मर्त-
व्येत्येतस्यां कल्पनायां सर्वविवादसिद्धिप्रसंगः स्यात् । किं चान्यत् । प्रतिपक्षे समानत्वात् ।
अस्मत्पक्षेऽपि तर्हि भगवत्पञ्चशिखादीनां प्रत्यक्षत्वात्सत्कार्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तस्मान्
क्रियागुणव्यपदेशासम्भवादसत्कार्यम् ।

This only refutes the argument based on the acceptance of the instrumental causes. The statement that your argument involves the undesirable contingency of non-applicability of the other means of knowledge, is true or correct. Your statement that there is no inference because there is no possibility of action, property and name is not proper.

Why?

Because we do not accept the difference in case of them. It is proper to infer the difference of action and property in case of those who maintain the difference between the effect and the cause, and in that case only the censure that there is no inference for the action and property of the cloth are not perceived at the state of the threads would find scope. On the other hand, this fault does not arise in our case because we hold that the effect is the composite or the attainment of the other form of cause only and, hence, the action and property are the accumulation or the particular manifestation. The denotation is the same in case of effect and the cause. This is improper.

Why?

Because it is not conclusive. The substance, property-ness and action-ness are related as property or activity, cause and effect and, hence, they are considered to be the existing elements and, therefore, serve as probans. Hence, we should not be questioned (for the purpose of refuting us) that the effect does not exist because there is no probans.

What is the reason?

Because of the context. In case there is controversy we apprehend through probans the existence of the effect earlier to its origination; this is the subject at hand. And, the non-conclusiveness is common. You maintain that the substance exists just after the origination (but without properties), and hence, the properties originate in the substance devoid of properties. Your position is that

just after its origination the substance persists without property and activity because you have stated that the object is devoid of property or action in the initial state just after origination. There is, however, no probans in case of that kind of substance (because the supposed probans do not exist). But still, its existence is admitted by you.²⁴ If you argue for its existence on the ground of the perception of its accomplishment or existence, it would not be right because there would arise the undesirable contingency of the establishment of all the subjects of controversy. After recognising the object which goes against the example, if you postulate that one should remember its objectivity to the knowledge of accomplished object even though it is objected to by others, it would involve the undesirable contingency of establishment of all the subjects of controversy. Moreover, it is similar in the case of the opponents also. Our position is that the effect in its causal state is perceived by lord pañcaśikha, etc.,. Hence, the existence of the effect (before its origination) should be accepted. Therefore, it is not that the effect does not exist (in the cause) because of the impossibility of action, property and name in it.

(Argument of success of the effort of agent refuted).

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं—कर्तृप्रयाससाफल्यादसत्कार्यमिति, अत्र ब्रूमः—एतदप्ययुक्तम् ।
कस्मात् ?

असदकरणात्

यद्युभयपक्षप्रसिद्धस्यासतः क्रियायोगः स्यात् अत एतद्युज्यते वक्तुम् कार्ये सति कर्तुः प्रयासोऽनर्थक इति । तत्त्वसतः करणमनुपपन्नम् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । हेत्वभिधानादसिद्धिरिति चेत् स्यादेतत्—यथा निष्पन्नत्वान्मध्वादीनां धारणसमर्थो घटो न क्रियत इत्ययमपदिष्टो हेतुरस्माभिः एवमित्थं कार्यस्यासतः कारणं नोपपन्नमिति नोक्तं भवता । तस्मादसिद्धिरिति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सत्यसति वा सम्बन्धे दोषप्रसङ्गात् । तद्धि क्रियमाणं सति वा सम्बन्धे कारकैः क्रियतेऽसति वा ? सम्बन्धश्चास्य भवन्नवृत्तिकाले वा कारणानां स्यात्, निष्पत्तिकाले वा ? किं चातः ? तन्न तावत्प्रवृत्तिकाले सम्बन्धो युक्तः । कस्मात् ? अद्रव्यत्वात् । प्रवृत्तिकाले कर्त्रादीनां क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावादवस्तुभूतं शशविषाणस्थानीयं वः कार्यम् । न चास्ति तथाभूतस्य वस्तुभूतेन सम्बन्धः । अथ निष्पत्तिकालेऽभिसम्बध्यते यदुक्तं सतो निष्पन्नत्वात्क्रियानुत्पत्तिरिति तस्य व्याघातः । अथ मतमसत्यपि सम्बन्धे निष्पत्तिर्भवतीति तेन कारकव्यापारवैयर्थ्यप्रसंगः । प्रागापि च कारकोपादानात्कार्यनिष्पत्तिप्रसङ्ग इति । उक्तं च

असत्त्वान्नास्ति सम्बन्धः कारकैः सत्त्वसंगिभिः ।

असम्बन्धस्य चोत्पत्तिमिच्छतो न व्यवस्थितिः ॥

इति ।

As regards your statement that the effect is non-existent because of the success of the effort of an agent, we reply that this is also wrong.

Why?

THAT WHICH IS NON-EXISTENT CANNOT BE PRODUCED;

If that which is related to the operation would have been admitted to be non-existent by both the parties, it would be right to say that the effort of the agent is purposeless when the effect (to be produced) is already present. But (the idea of) the production of the non-existent is not proper. Hence, it is improper.

If one argues that it is not proved because of the absence of forwarding some reason? It may be like this. The pot which is capable of retaining honey, etc., is not subject to production because it is already accomplished. This is the argument adduced by us. You have, however, not explained how it is improper to speak of the production of the non-existent.²⁵ Therefore, it amounts to the non-existence of the reason (or therefore, the reason adduced by you is non-conclusive).

This is also improper.

Why?

Because it involves the undesirable contingency of defect in admitting or not admitting the relation of the effect (with the cause). Is the object to be produced related to the instruments or not (while being produced)? The aforesaid relation with cause, if admitted, may be in the state of causal operation or in the accomplished state.

What is the use of this consideration?

This kind of relation is not possible in the state of causal operation.

Why?

Because it is not a substance. The effect at the time of operation of the agent, etc., in your theory is just like the horn of the hare because it is devoid of activity, quality and name, and consequently is not a substance. This kind of object cannot be related with some substance. If you say that it is related in the accomplished state, it will contradict your statement that the already existent object is already accomplished and there is no propriety of operation in that state. If

you hold that the origination takes place without the aforesaid relation, it will involve the undesirable contingency of the uselessness of the operation of the instruments.²⁷ Moreover, it will involve the undesirable contingency of the production of the effect even earlier to the employment of the instruments. It is stated also:

Because of the non-existence there is no relation (of the effect) with the instruments which are always related to the existing things only. There is no ground for those who believe in the origination of the unrelated effect.

आह, ननु च मध्यमे काले कर्त्रादिभिः कार्यं क्रियते ।

Opponent: The effect is created by the agent, etc., in the intermediary time.

कः पुनरसौ मध्यमः काल इति ?

Proponent: What is this intermediary time?

आह—

आरम्भाय प्रसृता यस्मिन्काले भवन्ति कर्तारः ।

कार्यस्यानिष्ठादात्तं मध्यमं कालमिच्छन्ति ॥ इति ।

यदा हेतवः प्रवृत्तारम्भा भवन्त्युद्दिश्य कार्यं न च तावन्नैमित्तिकस्यात्मलाभः संवर्तते स मध्यमः कालः । तस्मिन्क्रियते कारकैः कार्यमिति ।

Opponent: At the time in which the agents are engaged in activity after commencing it, is said to be intermediary because the effect is not yet accomplished.

When the instrumental causes are in some activity with the purpose of accomplishing some effect and until the form of the effect is not accomplished, that is the intermediary time. During that period the effect is created by the instruments.

उच्यते, न, अवस्थान्तरानुपपत्तेः । प्राङ्निष्पत्तेरसत्ता । निष्पन्नस्य सत्तेत्यवस्थाद्वयम् । सदसद्रूपा चावस्था नास्ति यो मध्यमः स्यात् । अतो न युक्तमेतदिति । किंचान्यत् । पूर्वदोषापरिहारादुद्दिश्य कार्यं तस्यात्मनो लाभात्केन सह सम्बन्ध इति ? अत्राप्ययं पर्यनुयोगो नैव निवर्तत इति । तस्माच्चित्रमपि वाक्यं प्रसार्य न किंचित्परिहृतं भवता । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् सत्यसति वा सम्बन्धे दोषप्रसंगादसन्न क्रियत इति ।

Proponent: No, because there is no reasonable ground for some other (third) state. There is the state of non-existence before origina-

tion. There is the state of existence for the originated effect. These are the two states. There is no state in the form of existence-non-existence which can be termed as intermediary time. Therefore, this is not proper. *Moreover, because the inaccuracy pointed out earlier is not alleviated.* With what object will the proposed effect be related because it is already in its accomplished form? This objection also does not cease to apply.

Hence, even after adducing such an interesting statement you could not alleviate something. Therefore, it is right to say that since the supposition of the presence or the absence of the relation involves inaccuracy, the non-existence is not brought into existence.

(Relation of effect with cause proves pre-existence of effect)

यस्य पुनः सत्कार्यं तस्य दोषो नास्ति । कस्मात् ?

उपादानग्रहणात्

उपादानमिति कारणं तन्त्वाद्याचक्ष्महे । तद्धि तस्य कारकैर्गृह्यते अभिसम्बध्यत इत्यर्थः । तस्माच्च नार्थान्तरं कार्यम् इत्यतः कारणेनाभिसम्बद्धानां कारककाणां कार्येणैव सम्बन्धो भवतीत्यदोषः ।

The defect does not arise in case of them who believe in the pre-existence of the effect.

Why?

BECAUSE THERE IS RELATION OF THE CAUSES (WITH THE EFFECT).

We state that the term upādāna denotes the material cause like threads, ect. That is grasped by, i.e, related to its instruments. Therefore, the effect is something else (than the cause); hence, the instruments related to the cause are related to the effect itself. Hence, there is no inaccuracy.

आह— ननु च यस्यापि सत्कार्यं तस्योपादानादर्थान्तरं तत्कार्यं स्यात् । कस्मात् ? कार्याधिभरुपादानात् । यद्यदर्थमुपादीयते तत्तस्मादर्थान्तरं यथा वेमादिभ्यः पटः । तन्तवश्च पटादिभिरुपादीयन्ते । तस्मात्तेभ्योऽप्यर्थान्तरं पट इति । एतेन सत्त्वं प्रत्युक्तम् । यद्यदर्थमुपादीयते तत्तस्मिन्नसत् । यथा वेमादिषु पट इति ।

Opponent: The effect arising of a particular material cause would be different from the material cause in case of those also who

believe in the pre-existence of the effect in the cause.

Why?

Because it (the material cause) is taken by those who desire to get that effect. The object is different from that for which it is selected; just as the cloth is different from the loom, etc. The threads are also selected by the desirous of the cloth. Hence, the cloth is different from them also. By this only their pre-existence is rejected. The object does not exist in the other which is selected for the former just as the cloth does not exist in the loom, etc.

उच्यते, न अवयविप्रतिषेधात् । प्रतिषिद्धस्तावदवयवी द्रव्यान्तरभूतस्तस्मादनुपपन्नार्थमेतत् । किं चान्यत् ।

सर्वसम्भवाऽभावात् ।

उपादानसामान्याद्वेमादिवदर्थान्तरं पटस्तन्तुभ्य इति ब्रूवतोऽर्थान्तरत्वसामान्यात्तन्तुवत्सर्वस्मात्कारणात्कार्यस्य सम्भवः स्यात् । न त्वेवमस्ति । तस्मात्सर्वसम्भवाभावादसम्यगेतत् । किंचान्यत्, जातिभेदप्रसंगादर्थान्तरारम्भप्रसङ्गाच्च उपादानसामान्याद्वेमादिवदर्थान्तरं पटस्तन्तुभ्य इति ब्रूवतो यथा वेमादिभ्यो भिन्नजातीयो भिन्नदेशश्च, तथा तन्तुभ्यः पटः स्यात् यथा चाऽवस्थिते पटे वेमादयः पटान्तरं कुर्वन्ति तथा ह्यवस्थिते पटे तन्तवोऽपि पटान्तरमारभेरन् । न चैतदिष्टम् । न तर्ह्युपादानसामान्याद्वेमादिवत्तन्तुभ्यः पटस्यार्थान्तरत्वम् ।

Proponent: *No, because we have rejected the composite as a different substance. We have rejected the composite as a different substance. Hence, the objection is not appropriate. Moreover,*

BECAUSE EVERYTHING IS NOT POSSIBLE (EVERYTHING).

You hold that the cloth differs from threads as it differs from loom, etc. because of the similarity of selection.²⁸ In the case, however, there would be the possibility of the origination of the effect from every cause as there is the possibility from the threads because the characteristic of being a different object is common in all the cases.²⁹ It is, however, not so. Hence, your argument is not proper on account of the absence of possibility of production of everything from everything. *Moreover, it would lead to the undesirable contingency of the distinction of genus, as well as of the origination of a completely different object.*³⁰ In case of them who speak of the cloth as different from the threads as it is different from the loom, etc., on the ground of the similarity of selection, the cloth would be different in

genus from threads and would occupy different space just as is the case with the loom, etc. And, the same threads would produce another cloth when the one is already accomplished just as the same loom produces another cloth when the one is already accomplished. This is, however, not desirable. Thus, on the basis of the similarity of selection, the cloth, however, cannot be established as different from threads as it differs from loom, etc.

(Non-existence of the effect in the selected cause refuted)

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं यद्यदर्थमुपादीयते न तत् तत्रास्तीति, अत्र ब्रूमः—अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? आधाराधेयभावानभ्युपगमात् । असकृदुक्तमस्माभिर्न तन्तुषु पटो नाम कश्चिदस्ति । किं तर्हि तन्तव एव पटः । ततु सन्मार्गविद्वेषाद् भवता न गृह्यते । किं चान्यत् । अनेकान्तात् । उपेत्य वा ब्रूमः कथं तावत्तिलास्तैलार्थमुपादीयन्ते, भवति चात्र तैलम् । मूढिका रसार्थमुपादीयते, भवति चास्यां रसः । गोधुक्च पयोऽर्थं गामादत्ते, भवति च तस्यां क्षीरम् । शालिकलापश्च तण्डुलार्थमुपादीयते, सन्ति चात्र तण्डुला इत्यनैकान्तिको हेतुः ।

As regards your statement that the object does not exist in the one selected for the purpose of producing it, we reply that it is wrong.

Why?

Because we do not admit the relation of the substratum and the object located (in the case of the cloth and the threads). We have repeatedly stated that there is nothing like cloth in the threads. On the contrary, the threads themselves are the cloth. That is, however, not acceptable to you because of your hatred towards the right way. Moreover, because of the non-decisiveness of your argument. Or, having accepted your opinion why the sesam seeds are selected for oil, the oil does exist in them. The vine is selected for juice; the juice does exist in it. The milkman selects cow for milk; the does exist in it. The bundle of paddy is selected for rice, the rice does exist there; hence, the reason is non-decisive.³¹

आह—आवरणोपलब्धेरयुक्तम् । तिलादिष्वावरणं प्रत्यक्षत उपलभ्यते । तत्रतिबन्धा-
तैलादीनामग्रहणम् । व्यापारश्च कर्तुस्तद्विगमार्थो न तु कार्यस्यावरणमस्ति । तस्माद्विषमो
दृष्टान्तः ।

Opponent: *your argument is wrong because of the cognition of covering.* The covering is directly perceived in case of the sesam seed, etc. Obstructed by that the oil, etc., are not cognised. And, the operation by the agent is to destroy (remove) that, and there is no covering of the effect there (in case of cloth).