

KĀRIKĀ 6 AND 7

(Scope of the inference based on general observation)

आह—अस्तु तावदक्षरान्निकर्षभाजामर्थानां प्रत्यक्षेणोपलब्धिः । असन्निकर्षभाजामपि चोपलब्धसम्बन्धानामनुमानेन । ये त्वतीन्द्रिया भावास्तेषामुभयवैलक्षण्यान्नास्ति प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामुपलब्धिः । आगमिकत्वे सर्ववादसिद्धिप्रसंगः । इत्यतोऽत्यन्तमेवाग्रहणं प्राप्तम् । तत्र यदुक्तमेतावद्भिः प्रमाणैः सकलपदार्थावबोध इति एतदयुक्तम् ।

Opponent : Let there be the cognition of the objects liable to the contact with the senses through perception, and that of those which are not liable to the sense-object contact, but in whose case the invariable association between the sign and the signate is observed, through inference. The objects, which are supra sensuous and as such are different from the two (kinds of objects) mentioned above, are not known through perception and inference. If they are supposed to be known through (revealed) scriptures, it leads to the undesirable contingency of establishment of all the theories (of opposite nature). Therefore, it is deduced that they are not cognised at all.¹ Consequently, it is wrong to say that through these means of knowledge only there ensues the knowledge of all the objects.

उच्यते—स्यादेतदेवं यद्येकरूपमेवानुमानमधीतं स्यात्, किं तर्हि त्रिविधम् । तत्र सत्यमेव पूर्ववच्छेषवती प्रागनुभूतसम्बन्धविषयफले इति कृत्वा न ताभ्यामशेषपदार्थाधिगमोऽभ्युपगम्यते ।

सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रसिद्धिरनुमानात् ।

1. If the scripture is rejected, there remains no source to know them.

यत्त्वेतत्सामान्यतोदृष्टमनुमानमेतस्मादतीन्द्रियाणामर्थानां समधिगमः प्रत्यवगन्तव्यः । कथम् ? यथा हि कृतकत्वानित्यत्वयोर्घटे सहभावमुपलभ्यान्यत्र शब्दादौ कृतकत्वदर्शनादनित्यत्वमनुमीयते । एवं शकलादीनां तज्जातीयतया चन्दनादिपूर्वकत्वसिद्धेः, कार्यकारणस्य सुखादिजातीयतया तत्पूर्वकत्वसिद्धेः, शयनादीनां च संघातत्वात्पारार्थ्यसिद्धेः, कार्यकारणस्यापि संघातत्वात्पारार्थ्यसिद्धिरिति सर्वमिष्टं सङ्गृहीतं भवतीति । येषां तु शेषवदेव सामान्यतोदृष्टं तेषां तस्य कार्यद्वारेण समधिगमहेतुत्वात् पुरुषस्याग्रहणप्रसंगः । वृत्तौ कार्योपचाराददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यद्यपि पुरुषस्य कार्याभावस्तथापि पुरुषाव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारविशेषाणां साम्प्रते काले स्ववृत्तिभ्यस्तेषां ग्रहणमित्युक्तम् । कस्मात् ? वृत्तिशक्तिरेषां कार्यत्वेनोपचरिता स्वमात्मानं युनक्तीति । तच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? हेत्वन्तराभिधानात् । यदि वृत्त्या ग्रहणं पुरुषस्य सूपपादमभविष्यत् संहतपारार्थ्यमाचार्यो हेतुत्वेन नावक्ष्यत् । तच्चावृत्तिभूतमित्यवश्यं शेषवत्सामान्यतोदृष्टयोरर्थान्तरभावोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । तस्मात् सिद्धं सामान्यतोदृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणामर्थानां समधिगमः ।

Proponent : It would have been the case if the inference would have been taught as of one kind only. On the contrary, it is threefold. It is right to say that the apriori and the aposteriori inference are having as their objects the things about which the relation of sign and signate is already cognised. Consequently, the cognition of all the objects is not admitted through them.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OBJECTS BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES ARISES THROUGH THE INFERENCE BASED ON GENERAL OBSERVATION.

It should be granted that through the inference which is based on general observation the objects which are beyond the reach of the senses, are cognised.

How ?

For example, after cognising the invariability of production and non-eternity in the pot, the non-eternity is inferred in case of word, etc., through observing their production. Similarly,

it is cognised that the fragrance is caused through sandal wood because the former is of the nature of the latter. Since both the cause and the effect are of the nature of pleasure, etc., the effects are cognised as arising from the pleasure, etc. Through the composite nature of bed, etc., their nature of serving the purpose of others is cognised; the nature of serving the purpose of others is established in case of the conglomeration of cause and effect because of their composite nature.² In this way, all that is desired to be established is included. There will arise the undesirable contingency of non-cognition of the conscious entity in case of those who hold that the inference based on general observation is identical with the aposteriori inference, for the latter serves as the means in the cognition through the effect (and there is no effect of the conscious entity).

If it is argued that it can be rendered faultless by taking *vṛtti* (functioning) as an effect metaphorically? It can be like this. Though there is no effect from the conscious entity, yet it is stated that the specific objects like conscious entity, the unmanifest, intellect and egoism are known through their function occurring at present.

Why?

When their power of functioning is metaphorically taken as effect, it relates to the conscious entity.

That is also wrong.

Why?

Because of the mention of some other reason. If the knowledge of the conscious entity could be well attained through its function, the author would not have spoken of the nature of composite as serving the purpose of some other as the reason

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2. For finite nature and homogeneity cf. the arguments to prove the existence of cosmic matter (kā. 15), and for the nature of serving others' purpose by the composite objects cf. the arguments to prove the existence of the conscious entity. (kā. 17).

(to establish the existence of the conscious entity). That statement is not that of function. Hence, the difference between the aposteriori inference and the inference based on general observation should be certainly admitted. Therefore, it is established that the knowledge of the objects beyond the reach of the senses arises through the inference based on general observation.

(Direct Inference and Inference-by-elimination)

तस्य प्रयोगमात्रभेदाद् द्वैविध्यम् । वीतः अवीत इति । तयो-
र्लक्षणमामनन्ति—

यदा हेतुः स्वरूपेण साध्यसिद्धौ प्रयुज्यते ।

स वीतोऽर्थान्तराक्षेपादितरः परिशेषितः ॥

स्वरूपं हि साधनस्य द्विविधम्—साधारणमसाधारणं च । तत्र साधारणं साध्यसहभावी तत्प्रतिपत्तिहेतुत्वेन यथावदाश्रीयमाणोऽर्थात्मा । असाधारणं पुनः परिमाणमन्वयः संघातपरार्थत्वमित्यादि । तत्र यदा हेतुः परपक्षमपेक्ष्य यथार्थेन स्वरूपेण साध्यसिद्धावुपदिश्यते तदा वीताख्यो भवति । यदा तु स्वसाध्यादर्थान्तरभूतानां प्रसंगिनां क्षेपमपोहं कृत्वा परिशेषतः साध्यसिद्धावुपदिश्यते तदाऽवीताख्यो भवति । तद्यथा न चेत् परमाणुपुरुषेश्वरकर्मदैवकालस्वभावयदृच्छाभ्यो जगदुत्पत्तिः सम्भवति परिशेषतः प्रधानादिति तदा पुनरवीताख्यो भवति । तत्र यदा वीतो हेतुः स्वबुद्धावहितविज्ञानसरूपं विज्ञानान्तरमादधानेन वक्त्रा प्रतिपाद्यादौ वाक्यभावमुपनीयते वाक्यमन्तरेणार्थस्य बुद्ध्यन्तरे संक्रामयितुमशक्यत्वात्, तदाऽवयविवाक्यं परिकल्प्यते ।

Only through the difference of application it is twofold—direct and the inference-by-elimination. The authorities record their definition thus :

The direct inference is that when a reason is employed in its very form, and the other (i. e., the inference-by-elimination) is that when another is implied through elimination of other objects.

The form of the sign is of two kinds—general and particular. Out of these, the general sign is that which consists with the signate and is employed (resorted to) in its essential form as a probans for cognising the probandum. The particular sign is exemplified as—finite nature, homogeneity and the nature of serving others object in case of an assemblage. The direct inference is that when the sign is employed for the establishment in the very form of the signate without eliminating the other stands. The inference-by-elimination is when the sign is employed to prove the signate through exclusion after eliminating the topics of discourse which are other than the object to be proved. For example, if there arises the possibility of the origination of the universe by atoms, the conscious entity (without cosmic matter), god, (previous) works, fate, time, nature (of the universe itself to grow), accident, and then by way of elimination it is deduced that it arises of the cosmic matter only. When the direct sign is put in the form of a sentence with reference to probandum, etc., by introducing some other knowledge similar to the one held in his own mind, the sentence containing the component parts of syllogism is contrived because the meaning cannot be communicated to others without sentence.³

(Component parts of Inference)

तस्य पुनरवयवाः जिज्ञासासंशयप्रयोजनशक्यप्राप्तिसंशयव्युदास-
लक्षणाश्च व्याख्याङ्गम् । प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तोपसंहारनिगमनानि परप्रति-
पादनाङ्गमिति ।

The component parts are as follows—inquisitiveness, doubt, purpose, conjecturing the (other) possible (alternative) and to throw aside the doubt. These are the components of explanation. Proposi-

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3. We prefer the punctuation of Chakravarti who does not give any punctuation after *upaniyate* to *Pandeya's* punctuation who inserts full stop, because *yadā* in the first part and *tadā* in the last part make it one sentence rather than two.

tion, probans, example, application and the conclusion are the components of propounding something for others.

(Inquisitiveness)

तत्र ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा । कश्चित् कंचिदुपसद्याह—पुरुषं ज्ञातुमिच्छामि । किमस्तिनास्तीति ? कुतः संशय इति पर्यनुयुक्तः प्रत्याह—अनुपलभ्यमानस्योभयथा दृष्टत्वात् । इहानुपलभ्यमानमुभयथा दृष्टम्—सद्भूतमसद्भूतं चेति । सद्भूतं चार्केन्दुमण्डलापरभागादि, असद्भूतं च शशविषाणादि । अयमपि चात्मा नोपलभ्यते । अतः संशयः किमस्तिनास्तीति ? किमस्याश्चिन्तायाः प्रयोजनमिति पृष्टो—शास्त्रसतत्त्वाधिगमः, ततश्च मोक्षावाप्तिः । कथमिति ? यदि तावदयमात्माऽस्ति ततोऽस्य अप्रकृतित्वोदासीन्यविभुत्वादिसतत्त्वविज्ञानान्नेरात्म्यभ्रान्तिविपक्षभूतादपवर्गप्राप्तिरवश्यंभाविनीति यदुक्तम् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानान्मोक्षोऽवाप्यत इति तच्छास्त्रमर्थवद् भवतीति । अथ नास्तीति निश्चीयते तेन सामान्यतोदृष्टादनुमानात्तद्वदन्येऽपि पदार्था न सन्तीति विप्रलम्भभूयिष्ठमार्षं दर्शनमपहायात्मग्रहदृष्टिविगमाल्लोकोत्तरमनवलम्बनं शून्यं ध्यानविषयमुपसम्प्राप्तस्त्रैधानुकव्लेशनिरोधलक्षणमात्यन्तिकं निर्वाणमवाप्स्यसीति । शक्यश्चायमर्थो निश्चेतुम्, प्रमाणत्रयपरिग्रहादिति व्यवस्थिते, व्युदास्य संशयं साध्यावधारणं प्रतिज्ञा । साध्यस्य यदवधारणमस्ति पुरुष इति सा प्रतिज्ञा ।

The inquisitiveness is the desire to know. After approaching someone one says—I want to know the conscious entity as whether it exists or not. When (with an object to contradict his statement) he is asked how does the doubt arise, he replies both the alternatives are observed in case of the object not perceived. The object not perceived is found in both the ways : existence as well as non-existence. The (imperceptible objects like the) other part of the disc of the sun and the moon are existent and the horn of the hare, etc., are non-existent. The soul is also not perceived. Hence, arises the doubt as to whether it exists or does not. While asked as to what is the purpose of the reflection, he replies—the knowledge of the

scripture with its sum and substance and the attainment of liberation thereby.

How ?

If the soul exists, through the knowledge of the soul with its essential nature, viz., its difference from the cosmic matter, indifference, all-pervasiveness, etc., which goes against the wrong notion of the non-existence of the soul, the attainment of liberation is certain, and consequently the statement of the scripture that the liberation is attained through the discriminative knowledge of the manifest, the unmanifest and the conscious entity becomes meaningful. If it is ascertained that the soul does not exist, through the inference based on general observation (it is ascertained that) the other similar objects also do not exist and, thus, after foresaking the theory handed down (to us) by the sages and mostly deceitful in nature due to the cessation of the notion of knowing the soul, the person who has attained the void which does not depend upon anything else as an object of meditation, will get the final release which is of the form of suppression of the suffering arising of the three substances.⁴ It is possible to ascertain the meaning because it is grasped through the threefold means of knowledge. When this (position) is ascertained, the affirmation of the probandum after throwing aside the doubt is proposition. That which is the ascertainment of the probandum is the proposition as 'the conscious entity exists'.

(Probans)

साधनसमासवचनं हेतुः । साध्यतेऽनेनेति साधनं लिङ्गम् । समासः संक्षेपः । साधनस्य समासवचनं साधनसमासवचनम् । साधनग्रहणं तदाभासप्रतिषेधार्थम् । न हि तानि साधनं, संशयविपर्ययहेतुत्वात् । समास-

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4. It brings out the basic difference between the Buddhists and the Brahmanical schools of Indian philosophy. The Buddhists vehemently criticise the existence of the soul while the doctrines of Brahmanical systems are centred around the existence of soul.

ग्रहणमवयवान्तरावकाशप्रदानार्थम् । लिङ्गनिर्देशमात्रं हेतुः । यस्तु तस्य साध्यसहभावित्वलक्षणः प्रपञ्चः सोऽवयवान्तराणीत्युक्तं भवति ।

The probans is the brief statement of the middle term. It (derivatively) means that through which something is proved. It comes to mean the distinguishing mark. The term samāsa means brief. The expression sādhanasamāsavacanam means the brief statement of the probans. The term sādhana is mentioned to negate (exclude) the fallacious reasons (or those appearing like reasons).⁵ They are not the probans because they cause the doubt and misapprehension. The term samāsa is mentioned to provide scope for the other members (of syllogism). The probans is merely the specific mention of the middle term. That which is its elucidation in the form of its invariable association with the probandum is stated to be the other members (of syllogism).

(Example)

उदाहरणन्त्वत्र निदर्शनं दृष्टान्तः । तस्य साधनस्य साध्येन सह-
भावित्वनिदर्शनं यदसौ दृष्टान्तः । तद्यथा संहत्यकारिणां परार्थत्वं दृष्टं,
यथा शयनासनरथशरणानाम् । व्यतिरेकस्त्ववीतस्य प्रसङ्गधर्मान्तर-
निवृत्तिरूपत्वात्तदन्तर्भूत इति न तदर्थं वैधर्म्यं दृष्टान्त उच्यते ।

An example is the illustration (or) parable. That which is the illustration of invariable association of the probans with the probandum is the example. For example, the objects functioning collectively are observed to be of the nature of serving the purpose of another, as it is observed in the case of bed, chair, chariot and the house. The counter example is included in that only because it is of the form of the inference-by-elimination which excludes the (other) possible qualities

5. Since *sādhana* means that which proves something, that which does not prove something, cannot be a *sādhana*. Thus, the fallacious reasons are excluded.

undesirably coming in it. Therefore, the counter example is not mentioned (here).⁶

(Application)

साध्यदृष्टान्तयोरेकक्रियोपसंहार उपनयः । साध्यस्य चक्षुरादिपारार्थ्यलक्षणस्य, दृष्टान्तस्य च शयनादेरेकक्रियोपसंहारः । तत्रार्थान्तरभूतत्वात् साध्यदृष्टान्तयोरञ्जसा नैकक्रियोपपद्यते । तेनैव तस्याऽनिदर्शनादित्यतो धर्मसामान्याद्यथेदं तथेदमित्येकक्रियोपचर्यते । यथा शयनादयः संहतत्वात्परार्था एवं चक्षुरादिभिरपि परार्थैर्भवितव्यम् । योऽसौ परः स पुरुषः ।

The application is to draw together the probandum and the example into the same action. For example, drawing together into the same action of the probandum (which at present is) in the form of nature of serving others object by eye, etc., and the example like bed, etc. The same action is not possible instantly in case of the probandum and the example because of their being different objects. Hence, on account of the non-visibility of that action the action is applied to the two on the basis of the similarity of the characteristics in the terms like 'as is this, so is that also'. For example, just as the bed, etc., serve the purpose of another because they are composite in nature, similarly the eye, etc., should also be of the nature of serving the purpose of another. That which is mentioned as other is the conscious entity.

(Conclusion)

तद्वशात्प्रतिज्ञाभ्यासो निगमनम् । हेतुदृष्टान्तोपसंहारापेक्षया यः पुनरभ्यासः तन्निगमनम् । तद्यथा—तस्मादस्ति पुरुष इत्येषामवयवानां परस्परसम्बन्धाद् विशिष्टार्थः समुदायो वाक्यमित्युपदिश्यते । वाक्यमप्यनेकं यदा गुणीभूतस्वार्थमर्थान्तरुपकारित्वादितरेण संसृज्यते तदा शास्त्रमप्येकं वाक्यमित्यवसीयते ।

6. The example is of two kinds : showing positive concomitance and the negative concomitance. The former is based upon *vita* while the latter, on *avita*.

The repetition of the proposition through the above mentioned process is the conclusion. The repetition requiring (i. e., through) probans, example and drawing together (of the probans and the probandum) is the conclusion. The collection of these members of syllogism carrying a special meaning due to their mutual relation is stated as the single sentence (vākya) as 'therefore, the conscious entity exists'. When many sentences with their own sense secondary (to the whole) are combined due to their service which they render to the other meaning (of the whole), the scripture is also resolved to be one sentence.

आह—जिज्ञासाद्यनभिधानम् । तद्व्यतिरेकेणापि स्वयमर्थगतेः ।
स्वनिश्चयवच्च परप्रतिपादनात् । यथा हि स्वयमुत्पद्यते निश्चेतुः प्रत्यय-
स्तथैवान्यः प्रत्याय्य इत्येतन्न्याय्यम् । न च स्वयमेवार्थं प्रतिपद्यमानस्य
जिज्ञासादीनां तत्र व्यापारः । तस्मात् परार्थमप्येषामुपादानं न कल्प्यते ।
संशयवचनानर्थक्यम् च, प्रतीतार्थत्वात् । निश्चितो हि वादिप्रतिवादिनौ
स्वपक्षयोः, तयोरितरेतरसंशयपर्यनुयोगे नास्ति प्रयोजनम् । किंचान्यत्—
प्रयोजनशक्यप्राप्त्यवचनं च । साधनाभ्युपगमादेव तत्प्रतीतेः । न हि महतां
निष्प्रयोजना प्रवृत्तिरुपपद्यते । न चाशक्येऽर्थे हिमवत्समीकरणादिषु
प्रवृत्तेः । तस्मादनर्थकं तदभिधानम् । तद्भावे भावादिति चेत् स्यादेतत्
सत्सु जिज्ञासादिषु तत्त्वाधिगमं प्रति प्रवृत्तिर्भवति, असत्सु न भवति ।
तस्मादेतान्यपि साधनं भविष्यन्तीति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ?
अतिप्रसंगात् । सत्स्वात्मान्तः—करणेन्द्रियालोकविषयेषु प्रवृत्तिदर्शना-
त्तेषामपि साधनत्वं स्यात् । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्माज्जिज्ञासादयोऽनर्थकाः ।
प्रतिज्ञादयो दुर्विहिताः । कथम् ? साध्याभिधायिनः प्रतिज्ञाभ्युपगमाद्
हेतुदृष्टान्तयोरपि तत्प्रसङ्गः साध्यावधारणस्यावयवान्तरेष्वप्युपपत्तेः ।
यदि साध्यावधारणं प्रतिज्ञेत्युच्यते तेन साध्यस्य हेतोर्दृष्टान्तस्य वा
यदवधारणं तदपि प्रतिज्ञा प्राप्नोति, निमित्ताविशेषात् । साध्यशब्दो
ह्ययं सामान्यवृत्तिः । न यत्नमन्तरेण विशेषेऽवस्थापयितुं शक्यत इति ।
किं च हेतुलक्षणानुपपत्तिश्च, साधनाऽनुपदेशात् । यो हि साधनसमास-
वचनं हेतुरित्येतल्लक्षणमाचष्टे तेन प्राक्साधनमभिधेयं स्यात् । ततो
वक्तव्यममुष्य समासवचनं हेतुरिति न चैवमुक्तम् । तस्मादलक्षणमेतत् ।
किंचान्यत्, समासवचनं च विस्तरनिषेधप्रसङ्गात् । यदि हि समासग्रहणं

क्रियते किं प्राप्तं योऽयमाध्यात्मिकानां भेदानां कार्यकारणात्मकानां चैक-
जातिसमन्वयो दृष्ट इत्येवमादिः साधनप्रपञ्चः सोऽहेतुरित्युक्तं भवति ।
तस्मात् समासग्रहणमनिष्टम् । लिङ्गाभिधानाददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्,
लिङ्गं हि नः साधनम् । तस्यात्र निर्देशः कृतः । तस्मात्स्वमतिजाड्यादि-
दमनिष्टमध्यारोप्यते, न त्वस्मत्प्रमादादिति । एतदप्युक्तम् । कस्मात् ?
तस्य द्विधा भिन्नस्य पञ्चधा साधनभावात् । तद्धि लिङ्गं वीतावीतत्वे-
नेष्टम् । तेन द्विधा भिन्नम् । तत्रापि वीतः पञ्चप्रभेदः इत्यतः समुदाया-
न्निष्कृष्टस्यैकस्य लिङ्गत्वमशक्यं वक्तुमिति । किञ्चान्यत्, दृष्टान्त-
लक्षणायोगश्च, शब्दार्थलक्षणेऽनिष्टप्रसङ्गात् । तन्निर्देशं दृष्टान्त इति ।
अत्र शब्दो वा येन साध्यसाधने निदर्शयते स दृष्टान्तः स्यात् ? अर्थो वा
यत्र निदर्शयते ? किञ्चातः ? तद्यदि तावच्छब्दः परिगृह्यते तत उपनय-
लक्षणं बाध्यते । कस्मात् ? न हि यथाऽभिधानं तथा साध्यमित्येकक्रिया
युज्यते इति । अथार्थः परिगृह्यते तेनाभिधेयस्य वाक्यानवयवत्वात्पञ्चा-
वयवत्वविरोधः । किञ्चान्यत्—दृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमनाऽभेदश्च हेतुप्रतिज्ञा-
र्थाभिधानात् । साधनत्वमेव साध्याविनाभावित्वलक्षणं दृष्टान्तोपनययोः
प्रत्यायय (य्य ?) ते । प्रतिज्ञार्थं च निगमनस्य नावयवान्तरत्वं युज्यते ।

Opponent : *The inquisitiveness, etc., should not be mentioned because one can know the object for himself without those also and because expounding of the object for others is also like the ascertainment for oneself. The propriety demands that 'as the knowledge has originated in the knower, the other should be made known in the same way'. There is no role played by the inquisitiveness, etc., in the case of one who is engaged in knowing the object for himself. Hence, their mention is not proper for the knowledge of others also, And, the mention of doubt is purposeless because the object is already known. The proponent and the opponent are firm with regard to their stands. They have no purpose to enquire into the doubt of the other with an intention of contradicting it.*

Moreover, (the components like) purpose and conjecturing the other possible alternatives should not be mentioned. They are

understood through the admittance of the probans itself. No purposeless activity arises in case of the great men, and their activity is not directed to the impossible object like the levelling of the Himalaya. Therefore, the mention of these is meaningless.

If it is argued that the activity (to know the truth) is found in the presence of them only? It may be like this. There is the activity towards knowing the reality in the presence of inquisitiveness, etc., and it is not (found) in their absence. Therefore, they will serve as the means.

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because of over-pervasion. Since the activity (towards knowledge) is observed in the presence of soul, internal organ, senses, light and the object, these would also be the means. This is, however, undesirable. Therefore, the mention of inquisitiveness, etc., is purposeless.⁷ *The proposition, etc., are not properly defined.*

How?

Since the proposition is admitted to be a statement of the probandum, there will be undesirable contingency of its application to the probans and the example, because the ascertainment of probandum holds good in the case of other members (of syllogism) as well. If the proposition is said to be the ascertainment of the probandum, the ascertainment of the probans and the example of that probandum would come to be proposition, because there is no difference in reason (i. e., causality). It cannot be restricted to a particular (object)

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7. The meaning is that though there are several things serving as causes, yet the mention should be made of those which are most necessary. The inquisitiveness, etc., are also not that necessary in inference to mention separately.

without (making) efforts (in this case).⁸ Moreover, the definition of probans is improper because there is no mention of definition of middle term (sādhana). One who gives the definition of probans as the brief statement of the middle term, would have stated the nature of middle term earlier. After that only it should be stated that the probans is the brief statement of this. And, it is not stated so. Therefore, it is not a (proper) definition. Moreover, the mention of brief involves the undesirable contingency of negation of detailed mention. If the term brief is mentioned, what is gained? (On the contrary) the middle term in details like 'the inclusion into one class is observed in case of the composite objects like the components of the body which are of the nature of cause of the effect', comes to be stated as the non-probans.⁹ Hence, the mention of the term brief is undesirable.

If it is argued that it is faultless on account of the mention of the probans? It may be like this, The probans is the middle term according to us. This is mentioned here. Therefore, though the dulness of your intellect that which is undesirable is imposed upon us; it is not through our mistake.¹⁰

It is also wrong.

Why?

This, which is divided into two, is the middle term of five kinds. The probans is desired to be of the form of direct sign

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8. The sense is that if the proposition is taken to be an ascertainment of the probandum, there should be other statement speaking of the ascertainment of probans and example as they are also equally the components of inference and all the components should be ascertained.
 9. Since it is in detail, it cannot be included under the present definition.
 10. We prefer *Chakravarti's* reading *pramādāt* to *prasādāt* of *Pāndeya*.

and that by elimination. It is, in this way, divided into two. Out of these, the direct is sub-divided into five.¹¹ It is, therefore, impossible to speak of the nature of probans as applicable to one taken out of the group. *Moreover the definition of example is not proper (lit. inapplicable) because it involves contingency of pervasion over undesirable (objects) whether it may be understood with reference to the words or the objects denoted.* The example is the instance. In this case (it may be asked) whether the instance refers to word through which the probandum and the probans are exemplified or the object where they are exemplified.

What is the use of this consideration ?

If the word is accepted (as referred to), the definition of application is contradicted.

Why ?

No single action is applicable here in the form 'as the statement of the object, so the probandum.'¹² If the object denoted is accepted (as referred to), it will contradict the fivefold components because the object referred to is not included into them. *Moreover, there would be non-difference of the example, application and the conclusion because they also refer to the sense denoted by probans and the proposition.* The nature of a middle term conveys invariable association which forms the character of example and application. The conclusion denotes the proposition and it is not proper to take it as an independent component.

उच्यते—यदुच्यते स्वनिश्चयेनाङ्गभावगमनात्परप्रत्यायनार्थं
जिज्ञासाद्यनभिधानमिति अत्र ब्रूमः—न, उक्तत्वात् । उक्तमेतत् पुरस्ता-
द्द्राख्याङ्गं जिज्ञासादयः । सर्वस्य चानुग्रहः कर्तव्य इत्येवमर्थं शास्त्र-

11. We have not been able to locate the names of five sub-divisions of direct inference.
12. We prefer to omit *na hi* as done in Poona Manuscript and accepted by *Chakravarti*.

व्याख्यानं विपश्चिद्भिः प्रतायते, न स्वार्थं स्वसदृशबुद्धयर्थं वा । तत्रैवं कल्प्यमाने ये व्युत्पाद्यास्तान्प्रति नैवैषामानर्थक्यम् । अथैतदनिष्टम्— यदुक्तं सन्दिग्धविपर्यस्ताव्युत्पन्नबुद्धचनुग्रहाथो हि सतां विनिश्चयः शास्त्र-कथेत्यस्य व्याघातः । किं च नियमाऽनभ्युपगमात् । न हि वयमेषामाव-श्यकमभिधानमाचक्ष्महे, किन्तर्हि यदा प्रतिवादी पर्यनुयुङ्क्ते—किं जिज्ञासस इति अवश्यमभिधानीयं शब्दमिति । केन धर्मेण, किं नित्यो-ऽनित्य इति ? कुतः संशयः ? मूर्तत्वात् । यस्तु न पर्यनुयुङ्क्ते न तं प्रत्येते वाच्याः । क्वचिदानर्थक्यात् सर्वत्र प्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न इतरेषामपि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । प्रतिज्ञादीनामपि तर्हि क्वचिदनभिधानमतस्तेषामपि सर्वत्रा-वचनं प्रसज्यते । तथा च भवतोक्तं कस्यचित्तु किञ्चित् प्रसिद्धमेव भवती-त्यन्यतरोक्तिरपि साधनं भवति, शब्द इवार्थद्वयप्रतीतत्वाद्बुभयानभिधान-मिति । यदप्युक्तं निश्चितत्वात् संशयावचनमिति असदेतत् । कस्मात् ? उक्तत्वात् । उक्तमेतत् सति पर्यनुयोगे तद्वचनमिति । एतेन प्रयोजन-शक्यप्राप्ती प्रत्युक्ते । यो हि पर्यनुयुञ्जीत किं प्रयोजनोऽयं शक्यो वाऽयमर्थ इति तं प्रति वाच्यमेतत् । यदप्युक्तं तद्भावे भावादिति—न, अनभ्युप-गमात् । न ब्रूमो यस्मात् सत्सु जिज्ञासादिषु तत्त्वाधिगमसद्भावस्तस्मा-देतेषामवयवत्वमिति । किन्तर्हि यं प्रत्येषां प्रतिपत्तावङ्गभावगमनं तं प्रत्येतानि साधनमिति । यदप्युक्तं साध्याभिधायिनः प्रतिज्ञाभ्युपगमा-द्धेतुदृष्टान्तयोरपि तत्प्रसङ्ग इति अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? जिज्ञासादेः सद्भावे सति तत्प्रतीतेः । यद्यपि साध्यशब्दोऽयमविशेषेण सिद्धत्वादर्थान्तरमाचष्टे तथापि यं प्रति जिज्ञासासंशयप्रयोजनशक्यप्राप्तयस्तस्य व्युदस्य संशयं साध्यस्यावधारणं प्रतिज्ञा, न हेतुदृष्टान्तयोस्तदस्तीत्य-सदेतत् । किंचान्यत् तद्भावेऽविरोधात् । यदा तु जिज्ञासादयो हेतौ दृष्टान्ते वा भवन्ति तदा किं कृतकः शब्दोऽथ न कृतकोऽथ बुद्धिनित्या क्षणिका वेति भवत्येव तदवधारणं प्रतिज्ञा । यदप्युक्तम् साधनानुपदेशा-द्धेतुलक्षणयोग इति असदेतत् । कस्मात् ? लोकप्रसिद्धत्वात् । यथा साध्यवत्त्वेनेप्सितः पक्ष इति प्रतिज्ञालक्षणमाचक्षाणो भवान् साध्यलक्षण-माचष्टे, कस्मात् ? साधनीयं साध्यमिति लोके सिद्धत्वात्, एवं साधन-समासवचनं हेतुलक्षणमाचक्षाणा वयं न साधनमाचक्ष्महे । कस्मात् ?

साध्यतेऽनेनेति कृत्वा साधनमिति लोके सिद्धत्वात् । उपेत्य वाऽनुमान-
निर्देशात् । लिङ्गं हि नः साधनं, तच्च निर्दिष्टमिति । यत्तूक्तं वीता-
वीतभेदे सति पञ्चधा साधनभावादिति, अत्र ब्रूमः, अयुक्तमेतत् ।
कस्मात् ? समासग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् । अतएव समासग्रहणं क्रियते, साधन-
स्वरूपाभिधानमात्रं हेतुरिति यथा विज्ञायते । प्रपञ्चस्त्ववयवान्तराणीति ।
एतेन विस्तरप्रतिषेधप्रसङ्गः प्रयुक्तः । कथम् ? न हि समासशब्दस्यायमर्थं
इति कृत्वा । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं शब्दार्थकल्पनेऽनिष्टप्रसङ्गाद् दृष्टान्तलक्षणायोग
इति, अस्तु तावच्छब्दो दृष्टान्तः । यत्तूक्तं उपनयलक्षणं बाध्यत इति
अनुपपन्नमेतत् । कस्मात् ? असम्भवे सति सम्बन्ध्यन्तरे कार्यविज्ञानात् ।
शब्देऽसम्भवादर्थे कार्यं विज्ञास्यामः अथवा पुनरस्त्वर्थो दृष्टान्तः ।
यत्तूक्तमभिधेयस्य वाक्यानवयवत्वात्पञ्चावयवत्वविरोध इति अर्थे-
ऽसम्भवाच्छब्दे कार्यं विज्ञास्यामः । यदप्युक्तम् प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वर्थाभिधानाद्
दृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमनानां नावयवान्तरत्वमिति अयमदोषः । कस्मात् ?
अप्रतिज्ञानात् । न ह्येतदस्माभिः प्रतिज्ञायते । किं तर्हि प्रमेयवचनं प्रतिज्ञा ।
प्रमाणरूपमात्रवचनं हेतुः । तस्य प्रमेयसहभावित्वनिदर्शनं दृष्टान्तः ।
साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्धर्मसामान्यादेकक्रियोपसंहार उपनयः । समुदायस्य
साध्यसिद्धये व्यापारनिर्देशो निगमनम् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । किंचान्यत् ।
एकस्य साधनभावपरिकल्पनावत्तत्परिकल्पने दोषाभावात् । यथा वाक्यम्
एवं च तदर्थश्च मुख्यौ शब्दाथौ, तयोरभिन्नार्थत्वादित्यभ्युपगमादेक-
मेवार्थमभागमक्रमं च बुद्धाववस्थाप्य श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वानित्यत्वकृतकत्वप्रमेय-
त्वादिलक्षणानां शक्तीनामपोद्धारात्साध्यसाधनसंशयरूपापन्नं वक्तारो
भिन्नमाचक्षते, न चैकार्थधर्मत्वात्साध्यसाधनसंशयाभिधानानामेकत्व-
मनुपज्यते । तथैकस्य साधनस्य साध्यधर्मतत्सहभावित्वलक्षणानां शक्ती-
नामभिधानं हेतुदृष्टान्तादिनाऽवयवान्तरं नः स्यात् । तत्र यदुक्तं प्रति-
ज्ञाहेत्वर्थाभिधानाद् दृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमनानां नावयवान्तरत्वमिति एतद-
युक्तम् । तस्मात्सूक्तं दशावयवो वीतः ।

Proponent : As regards your statement that the inquisitiveness, etc.,
should not be mentioned for making the others know since they
form the components of determination for oneself, we reply
that it is not so, because of the reply given above. It is already
stated that the inquisitiveness, etc., form the components of

explaining something. All should be favoured; it is for this that the explanation of scripture is preserved by the wise; not for themselves or for those who possess a similar intellect. When it is conjectured so, there is no uselessness of these for those who are learning (the scripture). Hence, the statement that 'the ascertainment of the wise in the form of the account found in the scripture is for the favour of those who are confused, possessing wrong knowledge and are not wise,' becomes contradictory and is not desirable. *Moreover, because no rule is admitted.* We do not prescribe that they should be mentioned necessarily. On the other hand, when the opponent asks as to what do you want to know, he should necessarily be replied as 'the words'. In what form? 'It is eternal or non-eternal?' How does the doubt arise? Because of their having a form. These are not to be stated to the one who does not ask.

If it is argued that the uselessness is applicable everywhere because of their uselessness in some cases, the reply is that *it cannot be held so because it would apply to the other cases like proposition as well.* In some cases the proposition, etc., are not mentioned. This would lead to the undesirable contingency of their non-mention in all the cases. In this way, you have stated that some object is surely familiar to someone. This another statement also serves as a proof. Since both the objects are conveyed, both should not be mentioned as is the case with the word.

Your statement that the doubt should not be mentioned because of the certainty, is also wrong.

Why?

Because we have already replied. It is already stated that it should be mentioned when it is asked. By this only the (objection regarding the mention of) purpose and conjecturing the possible (alternatives) is answered. One who asks as to what is the purpose or is this object possible, to him it should be mentioned. As regards the statement that the inference takes

place in presence of those only, we reply—it is not so, because it is not accepted by us. We do not say that the knowledge of reality takes place only in the presence of proposition, etc., (and) hence, they form the components. On the other hand, they serve as the means for one to whom they are the components in the process of knowing. Your statement that on account of admitting the proposition as the statement of probandum, probans and the example would be the proposition only, is wrong.

Why ?

Because the knowledge arises only in the presence of desire to know, etc. Although the term probandum denotes the other objects also as it is proved to denote something unspecified, yet the proposition is the ascertainment of the probandum after dispelling the doubt in case of the object about which there are the desire to know, doubt, purpose, conjecturing the other possible alternative, etc. It does not hold good in case of reason and example. Hence, it is wrong. *Moreover, because of non-contradiction (i.e., non-obstruction) in their presence,* When the desire to know, etc., are present in case of reason and example, their ascertainment is surely the proposition as in case of 'whether the word is a product or not'; 'whether the intellect is eternal or momentary'. Your statement that the definition of probans is proper because there is no exposition of the middle term (earlier), is wrong.

Why ?

Because it is well established in the world. Defining the proposition as the subject which is desired to be proved you also do not mention the definition of that which is desired to be (i.e., probandum),

Why is it so ?

The reply is obvious that because it is well established in the wordly behaviour that the probandum is that which is to be proved. Similarly, defining probans as the brief statement of

the middle term we also do not explain the middle term first.

Why ?

Because it is well established in the wordly behaviour that the term *sādhana* means that by means of which something is proved. Or, even after accepting your position, because there is the indication to the inference in vicinity. The characteristic feature (*liṅga*) is a probans in our theory and it is mentioned with reference to your argument that (the mention of brief is wrong) because the probans is of five kinds inspite of its division in direct and inference-by-elimination; we say, it is wrong.

Because of the force of the mention of the term brief (samāsa). For this reason only the term brief (*samāsa*) is mentioned so that it is understood that the probans is merely the mention of the form of the middle term. Its explanation is the other components. By this only the undesirable contingency of negating the detailed description. is answered.

How ?

Because it is not the meaning of the term brief (samāsa). As regards your statement that the definition of example is not applicable because it involves the undesirable contingency of its pervasion over undesired objects when postulated to be applicable to either of the word or the meaning, (we reply), let it refer to the words as example. Your objection that the definition of application is contradicted in this case, is wrong.

Why ?

Because in the case of impossibility, the operation is understood with reference to the other relata. In case of the impossibility with reference to the words we understand the operation with reference to the meaning. Or, let the object be denoted by the example. As regards your argument that it contradicts the

idea of fivefold component because the object denoted is not the component of the sentence, (we reply) we understand the operation with reference to the word when it is not possible in case of the object denoted. As regards your argument that the example, application and conclusion cease to be distinct component as they expound the meaning of the proposition and the probans only, we reply that is not a defect at all.

Why ?

Because it is not admitted. It is not admitted by us. On the contrary, the proposition is the mention of the object to be known. The probans is the statement of the means of knowledge. Showing of the invariable association of that with the object of knowledge is the example. Drawing together of the object to be proved and the example into a single action on account of the similarity of qualities is the application. The indication of the function of the collection (of these) for the establishment of the object to be established is the conclusion. Therefore, it is wrong. *Moreover, because there is not a fault in that kind of posulation as is the case of (i.e., there is no fault in) postulating the instrumentality of one.* As the sentence, so is the meaning. Both the word and its denotation are prominent because both refer to the same object. This being admitted, after having in mind the single object which is complete and devoid of sequence (in the process of knowledge) and which has attained the form of the probandum, the probans and the doubt on account of imposing upon it the powers in the form of audibility, non-eternity and productivity, is expressed as separate (i.e., separate ways) by the speaker. There follows identity of probandum, probans and doubt due to their being the qualities of a single object. In this way, in our theory the probans and the example, etc., will be different components of a single probans, which stand for the powers denoting the quality of the probandum and its invariable association. Hence, the statement that the example, application and conclusion will not be different components because of denoting only the

meaning of proposition and probans only, is wrong. Therefore, it is rightly stated that the direct inference has ten components.¹³

(Direct Inference should be mentioned first)

तस्य पुरस्तात्प्रयोगं न्याय्यमाचार्या मन्यन्ते । किं कारणम् ? अवीतलक्षणाविरोधात् । अवीतस्य हि लक्षणं परिशेषतः साध्यानुग्रहः । तत्रान्वयादिना स्वरूपेणाधिगते प्रधानलक्षणे धर्मिणि परपक्षप्रतिषेधमात्रेणोपसंहारे क्रियमाणे परिशेषलक्षणं बाध्यते । कस्मात् ? इह प्रतिषेधमात्रमादावुच्यते । तेन यथा हेतुविरोधात्परमाण्वादिभ्यो न व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते तथा हेत्वभावात् प्रधानादपि नोत्पद्यते इति शक्यं कल्पयितुम् । अतस्तद्व्यवच्छेदोपि चावीताद् गम्यते । तथा सति कः परिशेषः स्यात् ? स्वरूपेण तु परिच्छिन्ने धर्मिणि उपसंहारो यथावदवकल्प्यते । न चेत्यरमाण्वादिभ्यो व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते परिशेषतः प्रधानादेव व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते इति यथोक्तेभ्योऽन्वयादिभ्य इत्युक्तं भवति । तस्मात्प्राग्वीतप्रयोग इति सिद्धं सामान्यतोद्दृष्टादनुमानादतीन्द्रियाणामर्थानां समधिगम इति ।

The authorities consider its use earlier (to the *avīta*) to be right.

Why ?

Because (in this way) the definition of inference-by-elimination is not contradicted.¹⁴ The inference-by-elimination is defined as that which favours the probandum through elimination. When the nature of the probandum like cosmic matter is known through the probans like homogeneity, etc., and the conclusion is drawn through negating the opponent's stand, the definition of elimination is not contradicted.¹⁵

13. These are inquisitiveness, doubt, purpose, conjecturing the (other) possible alternative, throwing aside the doubt, proposition, probans, example, application and conclusion.
14. We prefer *lakṣaṇāvirodhāt* as found in poona manuscript and accepted by *Chakravarti* in comparison to *Pandeya's* reading. *lakṣaṇāvirodhāt*.
15. The text demands *na* before *bādhyate*.

Why ?

In the inference-by-elimination only the elimination is mentioned in the beginning. Consequently, it can be posited that as the manifest cannot come out of atom, etc., because of being contradicted by reasoning, similarly, it cannot come out of the cosmic matter also because of the lack of reason (in the favour). Therefore, the exclusion also is known through the inference-by-elimination.

This being the case, what may be the elimination ?

when the object is ascertained in its very nature, the right conclusion is drawn. (Otherwise) it will have to be stated that from the reason like homogeneity, etc., stated above it is concluded through eliminating (the others) that if the manifest does not come out of atom, etc., it comes out of the cosmic matter.¹⁶ Hence, the direct inference is used first, and this being the case it is established that the supra sensuous objects are known through the inference based on general observation.

(Causes of non-perception of existing objects)

आह—न, वारणान्तरतोऽनुपलभ्यमानानामग्रहणात् । यदि सामान्य-
तोदृष्टादनुमानात्सर्वं परोक्षमधिगम्यते इत्यभ्युपगम्यते प्राप्तमिदं येषा-
मप्यर्थानां कारणान्तरतोऽनुपलब्धिस्तेषामपि तस्मादेव ग्रहणम् । तद्यथा—

अतिदूरात्सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।

सौक्ष्म्याद् व्यवधानादभिभवात्समानाभिहाराच्च ॥७॥

तत्रातिदूरात्तावत् तद्यथा प्रोङ्डीनस्य शकुनेः । अतिसामीप्याद-
ञ्जनप्रभृतीनाम् । इन्द्रियघाताच्छब्दादीनाम् । मनोऽनवस्थानाच्छकटा-
दीनाम् । सौक्ष्म्याद्वृत्तद्यादीनाम् । व्यवधानाद्विरण्यादीनाम् । अभिभवा-
त्सूर्यप्रकाशाद् ग्रहादीनाम् । समानाभिहारादनेकप्रदीपप्रभाणां । चशब्दा-
देश्वर्ययोगाद्देवादीनाम् । न चार्हति भवितुं धर्मसामान्यानुपपत्तेः । तस्माद-
युक्तं सर्वमतीन्द्रियमनुमानग्राह्यमिति ।

16. The sense is that if the *avīta* is not employed, one will have to eliminate the other things even after proving one thing.

Opponent : *No, because the objects which are not known on account of some other reason are not known (through the inference based on general observation). If it is admitted that all the objects beyond the reach of the senses are known through the inference based on general observation, it comes to mean that the objects which are not cognised due to some other cause also are known through that (type of inference) only. To explain.*

(THE NON-PERCEPTION OF EVEN EXISTING OBJECTS IS CAUSED) BY EXCESSIVE DISTANCE, (EXTREME), PROXIMITY, DEFECT OF THE SENSES, UNSTEADINESS OF MIND, SUBTLETY, INTERVENTION, SUPPRESSION AND MIXTURE WITH OTHER SIMILAR THINGS.

Out of these, by excessive distance is explained as—the non-perception of the bird soaring very high. By extreme proximity—just as non-perception of the collyrium, etc. By the defect of the senses—just as non-perception of the word, etc.¹⁷ By unsteadiness of the mind—just as the non-perception of the cart, etc.¹⁸ By subtlety—just as the non-perception of the atom, etc. By intervention—just as the non-perception of the (hidden) gold, etc.¹⁹ By suppression—just as the non-perception of the planets due to the suppression by the light of the sun. By intermixture with other similar things—just as the non-perception of the lights of many lamps. By the word *ca* is intended the non-perception of the supernatural powers in the objects as in the case of the non-perception of gods, etc. The knowledge of them cannot take place (through the inference based upon general observation) because of the absence of any

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17. Even though sometimes the word is uttered, it is not heard due to the defect in ear.
 18. Sometimes it happens that the cart passes nearby, but is not perceived as the mind does not come in contact with the eyes at that time.
 19. The gold exists in mines but is not perceived as there is the layer of earth obstructing the vision.

similar characteristic. Hence, it is wrong to say that all the objects beyond the reach of the senses are liable to be cognised through inference.

उच्यते—शक्यं तावत्कारणान्तरतोऽनुपलभ्यमानं किञ्चित्सामान्यतो-
दृष्टादनुमानादधिगन्तुम् । तद्यथा समीपावस्थितस्य शकुनेरयत्नेन चक्षुषा
ग्रहणं, यथा यथा तु विप्रकर्षं प्रतिपद्यते प्रणिधाय चक्षुर्गृह्यते तावद्याव-
त्क्रमेणादर्शनमुपसंप्राप्तः । तत्र देशविप्रकर्षे प्रचीयमानेऽदर्शनमुपचीयमान-
मवगम्यात्यन्तादर्शनमपि पश्चात्तद्धेतुकमनुमीयते । तथा नातिसमीपा-
वस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्यास्फुटमाकारमवधारयं पश्चाद्यथा यथारादुपसंपद्यते तथा
तथा प्रतिपद्यमानदर्शनशक्तयोऽनुमातारः कृष्णसाराञ्जनप्रभृतीनाम-
ग्रहणमतिसामीप्यादनुमिमते । तथा गिरिसरित्समुद्रसमीपवर्तिनं श्रवण-
प्रतिघातिनं प्राक् शब्दमुपलभ्य पश्चात्तस्मिन्नेव देशे शब्दमगृह्णानाः
श्रवणोपघातमनुमिमते ।

Proponent : *Some objects not cognised due to some other cause can be cognised through the inference based on general observation.*

To explain, there is the cognition of the bird near the eye without effort; as it gets away it is cognised through the application of eyes with much effort as long as it disappears gradually. Thus, knowing the increase in disappearance due to the increase in distance, the total disappearance afterwards also is inferred to be caused by the same reason. Similarly, after observing the indistinct form of the object placed in extreme proximity as the person engaged in inferring gets away, he acquires the capacity prompting the appearance and infers that the non-perception of the black antelope and the collyrium is caused by extreme proximity. Similarly, after perceiving earlier the sound near the mountain, the river or the ocean, which troubles the ear, and not perceiving it afterwards the sound at the same place, one infers the defect in his sense of hearing.

(Scope of Valid revelation)

तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात्साध्यम् ॥६॥

तस्मादपि चासिद्धमित्यनेनागमविषये सामान्यतोदृष्टस्यानवतार-

माचष्टे । परोक्षमिति विषयं प्रति निर्दिशति । आप्तागमात्साध्यमिति विषयिणमाह । एतदुक्तं भवति—तस्मादपि सामान्यतोदृष्टादनुमानाद्यन्न सिद्धयति प्रत्यक्षग्राह्यमपि स्वयमदृष्टं कारणान्तरप्रतिबद्धविषयभाव-मत्यन्तपरोक्षं वा स्वर्गपवर्गदेवतादि धर्मसामान्यरहितं तदाप्तागमात्साध्यम् ।

AND THE IMPERCEPTIBLE OBJECT WHICH IS NOT ESTABLISHED THROUGH THAT ALSO IS ESTABLISHED THROUGH VALID REVELATION.

Through the expression 'and the object which is not established through that' the author speaks of the non-application of the inference based on general observation to the object to be known through valid revelation.²⁰ The term 'imperceptible' refers to the object. The expression 'is proved through valid revelation' refers to the knowledge (of the object). The statement comes to mean that the object which is not proved through the inference based on general observation and the perceptibility of which is also not experienced and of which the nature of being object of knowledge is obstructed by some other reason or the object like heaven, liberation and gods, etc., which are absolutely beyond the reach of the senses, and are devoid of common characteristic, are established through valid testimony.²¹

(Valid Testimony does not imply justification of all theories)

20. It suggests that the Sāṃkhyas favour the theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* according to which the scope of each *pramāṇa* is limited. Or, in other words, each means of knowledge has specific object to be cognised through it. It is in opposition to the theory of *pramāṇasamplava* according to which the scope of the *pramāṇas* is not restricted; many *pramāṇas* may be simultaneously applied to cognise the same object.
21. It shows that the objects of valid revelation are of two kinds : *parokṣa*, i.e., not cognised by other *pramāṇas* because of the obstruction through some cause mentioned above; and the *atyantaparokṣa* which are not at all cognisable through any of the other *pramāṇas*.

सर्ववादसिद्धिप्रसङ्गादप्रामाण्यमिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, यदि तर्ह्यागमः प्रमाणीक्रियते तेन प्रतिशास्त्रं येऽभियुक्तास्तेषां प्रामाण्यमित्यवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । एवं सति सर्वाचार्यप्रामाण्यादनेकविकल्पविचित्रा तर्कवृत्तिरित्यपरिनिश्चितत्वाद् भ्रान्तिः प्रसज्येत । तथा च सति जिज्ञासूनामपवर्गप्राप्तिविघातः स्यात् । तस्माद् भिषजेव भवता परोपदेशः प्रयुक्तो नास्मानयं प्रीणाति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? आप्तलक्षणस्यानवधारितत्वात् । व्यपगतरागादिदोषाणामसन्दिग्धमतीनामतीन्द्रियार्थदृश्वनामीश्वरमहर्षीणामाप्तत्वमाचक्ष्महे, न सर्वेषाम् । यदि चान्योप्येवंधर्मोऽस्ति भवतु प्रमाणम् । किंचान्यत् । स्वविषये च तत्प्रामाण्यस्यादोषवत्त्वात् । यस्य खल्वपि यो विषयस्तस्य तस्मिन्विषये वचोऽन्तरेणापि साधनं प्रामाण्यमित्यवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । इतरथा प्रतिशास्त्रमाचारस्थितिनियमानामदृष्टार्थानामप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । एतेनाखिललिङ्गादागमोऽर्थान्तरम् । यस्मान्महताभिधानेन युक्तिरन्विष्यते तस्माद्युक्त्यपेक्षाल् लिङ्गादागमोऽर्थान्तरमिति ।

If it is argued that it is not valid because it involves the undesirable contingency of the proof for all the theories (right or wrong)? It may be like this. If the revelation is held to be an authority, the authority of the persons proficient in each scripture should necessarily be admitted. In this case, because of the authority of all the teachers and due to the varied function of reasoning²² on account of many alternatives, there arises the undesirable contingency of propriety because nothing will be absolutely ascertained. This being the case, the attainment of liberation by the aspirants would be obstructed.²³ Therefore, just like a physician you have followed the advice given by others only. It does not satisfy us.

22. Logic is such a method through which anything right or wrong can be proved. Even one thing proved by one logician can be disproved by some other more powerful logician.
23. Since the nature of the objects would be uncertain, one will be confused and would not attain the knowledge leading to liberation.

It is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of the non-ascertainment of the (nature of) validity (by you). We speak of validity with reference to the great seers devoid of the vices like attachment, etc., who are of doubtless intellect and who have visualised the objects beyond the reach of the senses, and not of every body. If some other has these characteristics, let him be reliable. Moreover, there is no defect in accepting the authority in one's own field. It should surely be admitted that it goes without saying that the statement of one in his own field is valid without some other reason. Otherwise, there would be the non-acceptance of the rules, for the maintenance of the ethical code, which are not perceptible and are propounded by works on different branches of learning. This proves that the scripture is different from all logical process. Since reason is investigated by powerful statement, the revelation is different from the probans, which requires the reasoning.²⁴

(Revelation cannot be included under inference)

आह न, अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामधिगमहेतुत्वात् । यथा कृतकत्वादि-धर्मोऽनित्यत्वादौ विषये दृष्टस्तदभावे चादृष्ट इत्यनित्येऽर्थे निश्चयमाद-धाति एवं शब्दोपि स्वार्थे दृष्टोन्यत्र तज्जातीये न दृष्टः प्रतिपत्तिहेतु-र्भवति । तस्मादनुमानादभिन्न एवायमिति ।

Opponent : *No, because it (the word) is the means of understanding through positive and negative (examples). Just as the quality like productivity brings about the ascertainment of the non-eternity of the object because it is observed in case of the non-eternal and is not observed in its absence, the word also which is observed to be used in its own sense and not in other similar meanings is the cause of understanding. Therefore, it is not different from inference.*

उच्यते—चन्द्रादिष्विदानीमसाधारणविषयेषु का प्रतिपत्तिः स्यादिति ?

24. The scripture does not require reasoning for its validity. It is valid in itself. The probans, however, depends upon reasoning for its validity.

Proponent : Now, how could we understand the word Candra, etc., in the sense of unique object ?

आह—अवयवापेक्षत्वाच्चन्द्रशब्दो ह्यनेकेषु वचनेषु वर्तते, जातिद्वयगुणक्रियासु च, तथा ङित्थादिशब्दः, तस्मादेवंजातीयकानामपि चानुमानादभेदः ।

Opponent : The term candra is also used from the point of view of many components in many numbers²⁵ (i. e., singular, plural, etc.,) as also generality, substance, quality and action. Similar is the case with the words like ङित्था, etc. Therefore, these kinds of words also are not different from inference.

उच्यते—स्वर्गादीनां तर्हि कथमनुमानत्वमिति ?

Proponent : How can there be the inference in case of heaven, etc. ?²⁶

आह—आप्तवचोऽविसंवादसामर्थ्यात् । यथा हैरण्यकप्रभृतीनामाप्तानां वाक्यमव्यभिचारि एवमीश्वरमहर्षयोपि चाप्ताः । तस्मादेवामपि वाक्यमव्यभिचारीति शक्यमत्रापि सामान्यविषयत्वं कल्पयितुम् । एवमनुमानमेवागम इति ।

Opponent : It (the heaven) is inferred because of its capacity of non-contradiction with authoritative statement. As the statement of the authoritative persons like Hairaṇyaka is true, so the lord great seers are also authority. Therefore, the statement of these also is true. Thus, commonness of objects can be postulated in this case also. In this way, the valid testimony is inference only.²⁷

25. We prefer *Chakravarti's* reading *vacaneṣu* instead of *Pandeya's* reading *avayuveṣu*.

26. No object similar to heaven is observed, and hence, there is no inferential criterion to apply a particular word in that sense.

27. The sense is that when the word uttered by a worldly person is considered to be authoritative, the words of the great seer like Kapila talking of supra sensuous objects should be considered as authority.

उच्यते—यदुक्तमन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामधिगमहेतुत्वाच्छब्दोऽनुमानमिति अत्र ब्रूमः न, अप्रतिज्ञानात् । न हि दयं व्यवहारानुपातिनां वृक्षादीना-
मागमत्वमाचक्षमहे, किं तर्हि स्वर्गादीनामत्यन्तपरोक्षविषयाणाम् । तस्माद-
प्रतिज्ञानादानुपालम्भोऽयमिति । उपेत्य वा वक्त्रपेक्षत्वात् । अथवोपेत्यापि
सर्वशब्दानामागमत्वमनुमानादर्थान्तरभावं ब्रूमः । तथा हि कृतकत्वादिति
लिङ्गं चण्डालकापालिकैरपि प्रयुज्यमानं साहचर्यापेक्षं निश्चयमादधाति ।
न वक्तृविशेषमपेक्षते । वक्तृविशेषापेक्षस्तु शब्दः । तस्मान्न लिङ्गम् ।
किं चान्यत् विपर्ययात् । न हि लिङ्गं देशान्तरे विपर्येति । शब्दस्य तु दृष्टो
विपर्ययः । स एव हि शब्दो देशान्तरे, कालान्तरे तु स्वार्थं न प्रत्याययति
अर्थान्तरं च प्रशंसति ।

Proponent : As regards your statement that the word is inference only because it serves as a means of understanding through negative and positive instances, we reply, *it is not so because use of it is not admitted by us.* We do not speak of valid testimony with reference to the objects like tree which are experienced in our day-to-day life. On the contrary, we admit so in case, of the absolutely non-perceptible objects like heaven. Hence because of our non-acceptance it is not a defect (lit. censure).²⁸ Or, even after we accept it on account of the requirement of particular speaker. Or, (even) after accepting the position of taking the nature of testimony in case of all the words, we speak of its distinction from inference. (To explain) the probans like productivity, etc., used even by a kāpālika of wicked deeds, bring about the ascertainment due to the requirement of the invariable concomitance. It does not stand in need of a particular speaker. The valid testimony, on the

28. The sense is that the Sāṅkhyas accept *pramāṇavyavasthā* and, hence, the objects to be cognised through verbal testimony are not the objects of daily experience but those which are *ati-parokṣa* (absolutely beyond the reach of the senses) like heaven.

other hand, requires the particular speaker.²⁹ Hence, it does not serve as a probans. *Moreover, on account of inversion.* The sign does not change in some other places. The change is certainly observed in case of word. The same word in some other place or at some other time does not convey its own sense and refers to some other object.

सम्बन्धानुपलब्धेरिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, सम्बन्धान्तरं देशान्तरेऽनुपलक्षितम् । तस्माच्छब्दार्थविपर्यय इति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । लिङ्गवैधर्म्यात् । न हि प्रत्यक्षाभिमत्तस्य लिङ्गिन उपलब्धौ गवादेर्लिङ्गं नोपलभ्यते । शब्दस्तूपलभ्यमानो गवादौ नोपलभ्यते । तस्मान्न लिङ्गम् । किञ्चान्यत् । देशनियमात् । न हि लिङ्गस्य देशनियमो दृष्टः । अस्ति तु शब्दस्य देशनियमः । तद्यथा शवतिर्गतिकर्मा काम्बोजेष्वेव भाष्यते । रंहतिः प्राच्येषु, तथा दातिर्लव्नार्थः; दात्रमुदीच्येषु नान्यत्र । तस्मान्न शब्दो लिङ्गम् । किञ्चान्यत्, इष्टतो विनियोगात् । स्वाभाविकं लिङ्गम् । न हि धूमोर्नेरपक्व्य शक्यतेऽप्सु वायावाकाशेऽन्यत्र वा निवेशयितुम् । शब्दस्तु यत्र वक्तुरभिप्रायस्तत्र तत्र विनिवेश्यते । यथा वृद्धचादयः शब्दाः स्वार्थाभ्युच्चयादिषु प्रसिद्धा आदैक्षु विनिवेश्यन्ते । तस्मान्न ते लिङ्गम् ।

If it is argued that it is due to the non-cognition of the relation between the two? It may be like this. The other relation (of a word with some means) is not observed in some other place. Hence, arises the change in the meaning.

This is wrong because of dissimilarity from sign. It is not that when the signate like cow established through perception is observed, the sign is not perceived. The word, on the contrary, is present but is not found used in the sense of cow, etc. Therefore, it is not the sign. *Moreover, on account of the restriction with reference to the place.* The restriction with reference to the place

29. The inference depends upon the validity of probans irrespective of the man putting forth the probans because it can be verified through other means. The object of verbal testimony, however, cannot be verified through other means and, hence, depends upon the authority of the speaker only.

is not observed in case of sign. There is certainly the restriction with reference to the place in case of word. To explain, the verb *śavati* meaning to go, is prevalent in the residents of Kamboj only. By the eastern people *rañhati* is used (in the same sense); *dāti*, in the sense of cutting is prevalent in the residents of the east only. Among the residents of north it is prevalent as *dātram* and not anywhere else.³⁰ Therefore, the word is not the sign. Moreover, because of its use in accordance with the intention of the speaker. The sign is natural (in case of the signate). It is not possible to locate smoke in water, air, sky or somewhere else after drawing it away from fire. The word is used where there is the intention of the speaker. For example, the words like *vṛddhi* though well known in the sense of increase, etc., are used in the sense of *āt* and *aic*.³¹ Therefore, they are not the sign.

सर्वाभिधानशक्तिवत्त्वाच्छब्दस्यादोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतं सर्वाभिधान-
शक्तिः शब्दः सर्वाभिधेयशक्तिश्चार्थस्तयोः पुरुषव्यापारेण शक्त्यवच्छेदः
क्रियते । कथम् ? अयमेव शब्दोऽस्यार्थस्य प्रत्यायको भवतु । अयमेव
चार्थोज्जेन शब्देनाभिधीयताम् । एतावति पुरुषव्यापारः । तस्माच्छब्दस्य
स्वाभाविकः सम्बन्धो वक्त्रपेक्षया व्यज्यत इति । एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् ।
कस्मात् ? सुतरामनुमानादर्थान्तरत्वप्रसंगात् । एवमपि कल्पयित्वाऽनु-
मानात्सुतरां शब्दस्यार्थान्तरत्वमापद्यते । कस्मात् ? न हि यथा वक्त्रपेक्षया
सर्वास्त सतः शब्दस्य शक्त्यवच्छेदस्तथा सर्वार्थं लिङ्गं वक्त्रपेक्षयार्था-
न्तरादवच्छिद्यते । यथा चैकः शब्दो जगत्येवमुदितः पुरुषविनियोगापेक्षः
सर्वमर्थमभिधातुं समर्थस्तथैकं लिङ्गं कयाचिद्युक्त्या सर्वार्थप्रत्यायन-
समर्थम् । तस्मान्न शब्दो लिङ्गम् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तम् चन्द्रादीनामवयवापेक्षं
सामान्यमभ्युपगम्यते । तदयुक्तम् । असाधारणत्वात् । अनुमानाभावे
शब्दप्रसिद्धोऽर्थ इति व्याघातः । किं चान्यत् । जात्यादिसाध्यत्वात् जाति-
गुणद्रव्यक्रियाणां च परस्परतोऽर्थान्तरत्वं, समुदायश्च साध्यः । तस्माद-
युक्तमेषां तदपेक्षया सामान्यविषयत्वम् । यदप्युक्तमाप्तवादाविसंवाद-

30. A similar idea is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.1

31. Cf. Pāṇini 1.1.1

सामान्यात्स्वर्गादिशब्दानामनुमानत्वमिति, अत्र ब्रूमः—एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? प्रमाणविषयत्वात् । सत्यमस्त्येषां सामान्यपरिकल्पना, सा तु प्रमाणविषया न तु प्रमेयविषया । प्रमेयं तु सामान्यमनुमानस्येत्ययमभ्युपगमो वः । तच्चासाधारणत्वात्स्वर्गादीनां प्रतिषिद्धम् । तस्मात्त्यज्यतामियमाशङ्कानुमानमेवागम इति ।

If it is argued that it is not a fault because of the capacity of word to denote every object ? It may be like this. The word is capable of denoting every object and the object is also capable of being denoted by every word. Their power of denotation is limited through the effort of the man.

How ?

This word should be the conveyer of this object only. And, this object should be meant by this word. The effort of the man is in this direction. Therefore, the natural relation found in the word is manifested by the intention of the speaker.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it easily implies the undesirable contingency of its distinction from inference. After postulating this also the distinction of the word from the inference easily follows.

Why ?

It is not that the sign is (capable of being) used to prove everything and is distinguished from other objects (limited with a particular object) through the intention of the speaker as the power of the word, which can be used in all the senses, is restricted through the intention of the speaker. For example, the single word uttered in this way and standing in need of being restricted (to a certain meaning) by the person, is capable of denoting all the objects, in the same way, (it is not that) the single sign through some reasoning is capable of conveying all the objects. Therefore, the word is

not a sign. *The statement that the commonness is accepted in case of moon, etc., from the point of view of its components (to be understood), is wrong because of the uncommon character (of the word).* This is contradictory to (the maxim) that the object is established through the word in the absence of inference (i. e., where the inference is not applicable). *Moreover, because commonness, etc., are to be established.* The mutual distinction in genus, quality, substance and action, and the combination of all is to be established. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the commonness stands in need of them. As regards your statement that there is the inferential nature in words like heaven, etc., because of the common quality of non-contradiction found in the valid statement, we reply that it is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it (i.e., common quality) is with reference to the means of knowledge. It is true that there is some postulation of common quality in case of them, but that is with reference to the means of knowledge and not with reference to the object of knowledge. Your first opinion is that in the case of inference the object cognised is general. This is negated in case of heaven, etc., because of their being unique. Hence, abandon the doubt that the valid testimony is only the inference.³²

अन्यः पुनरनुमानागमयोरभेदप्रतिज्ञ इदमाह । स्वर्गादयः शब्दा न प्रमाणम् । कस्मात् ? प्रमाणान्तरेण तदर्थानुपलब्धेः । यस्य हि शब्दस्यार्थः प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुमानतो वा नोपलभ्यते स न प्रमाणम् । इतरस्तु प्रमाणम् । तद्यथा नद्यास्तीरे पक्वमाश्रयनं, पथि गुडशकटं विपर्यस्तमिति । न च स्वर्गादिशब्दानामर्थः प्रमाणान्तरेणोपलभ्यते । तस्माद्यथा विभुरात्मा सर्वत्र सुखादिसम्भवादित्येवमादयो बौद्धं प्रति धर्म्यसिद्धत्वादयो यथार्थास्तथा वेदशब्दा अपि प्रायेणेति । एतत्तु न युक्तरूपम् । कस्मात् ?

32. The sense is that the inference always gives rise to the knowledge of generality only while the verbal testimony gives rise to the knowledge of unique objects also.

अन्यायेन सर्वशब्दापवादात् । का ह्यत्र युक्तिर्यदस्मदादिभिरनुपलभ्यमानार्थं प्रमाणभूतानामपि वाक्यमयथार्थं स्यात् ? सर्वेण चावश्यं कश्चिदाप्तस्तस्य च वाक्यमदृष्टार्थमित्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । अतोयं तवात्रापि समानः प्रसंगः । न च प्रमाणं स्वार्थसिद्धये प्रमाणान्तरमपेक्षते । तत्र यदि शब्दस्य प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षं यथार्थत्वमाश्रीयते तेन न केवलं स्वर्गादयः किं तर्हि शब्दा एवाऽऽप्रमाणमिति प्राप्तम् । अनुमानस्य च प्रमाणान्तरनिरपेक्षस्य गमकत्वाभ्युपगमादागमस्य ततोऽर्थान्तरत्वं सुतरां प्रसज्यते । तस्माद्युक्तागमविरोधिन एवविधा नास्तिकवादाः श्रेयोऽर्थभिर्दूरादपोह्या इति स्थितमेतत्—अनुमानादसिद्धं वस्तु यत्तदाप्तागमात्साध्यमिति ।

एवमस्य त्रिविधस्य प्रमाणस्यैन्द्रियिकं कारणान्तरतोऽनुपलभ्यमानं च प्रमेयं व्याख्यातम् । एतस्मात्तु यदन्यत्तदसदिति प्रत्यवगन्तव्यम् ॥६-७॥

Someone else, who asserts the non-difference between valid testimony and inference states as follows. The words like heaven are not the means of valid knowledge.

Why ?

Because the object denoted by them is not cognised through some other means of knowledge. The word, the object denoted by which is not cognised through perception or inference, is not a means of valid knowledge. However, the other word (i.e. object denoted by which is cognised through some other means of knowledge) is a means of valid knowledge. For example, (the mangoes in the) grove of mango-trees on the bank of the river are ripen, the cart loaded with treacle is riverted (are the words leading to valid knowledge). And, the object denoted by the words like heaven is not cognised through some other means of knowledge. For example, as the object conveyed through the expressions like 'the soul is all-pervasive because of the possibility of pleasure, etc, everywhere', are not valid for the Buddhists because the suabstratum of the qualities is not proved for them. Similar are generally the vedic words.

It is, however, not correct.

Why ?

Because of the exclusion of all the words without logic. What is the logic here that the sentences, the objects denoted by which are not cognised by the persons like us, are not valid even when they come from the authoritative persons ? It should be admitted by all that someone is trustworthy and his statement pertains to the supra-sensuous object. Therefore, in this case your (theory) also involves the undesirable contingency. It is also not that the means of knowledge requires the other means for establishing their objects. If the validity of words is held to depend upon some other means of knowledge, not only the heaven, etc., but all the words would be invalid. And, due to the admittance of the nature of establishing all the objects without depending upon any other means of knowledge in the case of inference, the nature of being a distinct means of knowledge is well applicable to the valid testimony. Therefore, it is right for the person desirous of felicity to avoid from a distance this kind of theories of the non-believers in the vedas, which go in contradiction with the sacred texts. Hence, it is well established that the objects not established through inference are to be established through the valid testimony.

In this way, the objects of the threefold means of knowledge, liable to be cognised through the sense-organs and those not cognised due to some other cause, are explained. The object, different from this, should be understood as non-existent.

KĀRIKĀ 8

(Cause of non-perception of the cosmic matter)

आह, यद्येवं प्रधानस्यासत्त्वप्रसङ्गः । अनुपलब्धौ कारणान्तरत्वा-
नुपलब्धेः । तद्धि प्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वे सत्यतिदूरादिभिरनुपलब्धिकारणैर्नोप-
लभ्यते । तन्न तावत् अतिदूरात्सामीप्याद्व्यवधानाच्चास्याऽग्रहणम् ।
कस्मात् ? विभुत्वात् । नेन्द्रियघातात्, अविकलेन्द्रियैरग्रहणात् । न मनो-
ऽनवस्थानात्, अवस्थितमनोभिरग्रहणात् । न सौक्ष्म्यात्, शशविषाणादीनां
सत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । नाभिभवात्, असम्भवात् । न समानाभिहारादेकत्वात् ।
तस्मात् कारणान्तराभावतोऽनुपलभ्यमानस्यासत्त्वमिच्छतः प्रधानस्यापि
शशविषाणादीनामपि सत्त्वप्रसङ्गः । अथैतन्नेष्यते कारणान्तरं तर्ह्यनुप-
लब्धौ वक्तव्यमिति ।

Opponent : If it is so, there arises the undesirable contingency of the non-existence of the cosmic matter because no other cause¹ (than non-existence) is observed for its non-perception. It is not the subject of perception and it is not perceived due to the causes of non-perception like excessive distance, etc. It is not that its non-perception is due to excessive distance, extreme proximity and intervention.

Why ?

Because of its being all pervasive.² Nor is it not perceived due to defect of the senses because of its being non-perceptible (even) to those possessed of perfect (lit. defectless) senses. Nor is it due to unsteadiness of mind because of its non-perception (even) by persons of steady mind. Nor is it

1. It refers to the cases listed in the 7th kārikā. The objector further alleviates the application of all these causes of non-perception to cosmic matter.
2. As it is all-pervasive, it is neither extremely distant nor extremely near. Nor is there any intervention between it and the senses.

due to its subtlety; otherwise it would lead to the undesirable contingency of the existence of the hare's horns, etc.¹ Nor is it due to suppression because it is not possible (in case of cosmic matter). Nor due to its intermixture with other similar things because it is single. Therefore, for those who intend (to establish) the non-existence of the object which is not perceived in the absence of some other cause (obstructing the perception), there arises the undesirable contingency of the absolute non-existence of cosmic matter just like that of hare's horns. If it is not acceptable to you, some other cause for its non-perception should be stated.

(Subtlety causes the non-perception of cosmic matter)

उच्यते—यत्तावदुक्तं अनुपलब्धौ कारणान्तरानुपपत्तेः प्रधानस्यासत्त्वप्रसङ्ग इति, अत्राऽस्तु ।

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात् ।

यत्तूक्तं शशविषाणादीनामपिसत्त्वप्रसङ्ग इति तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? साधनोपपत्तेः । अस्ति हि प्रधानस्य सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धौ साधनं, न शशविषाणादीनाम् । किं तत् ? उच्यते ।

कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धिः ।

प्रधानस्य हि कार्यत उपलब्धिरित्येतदुपरिष्ठात्प्रतिपादयिष्यामः । न तु शशविषाणादीनां कार्यमस्ति । तस्माद्विषमोऽयमुपन्यासः ।

Proponent : As regards your statement that there arises the undesirable contingency of the non-existence of the cosmic matter due to impossibility of some other cause of non-perception, let it be like this :

1. If it is argued that whatever is not perceived exists but is not perceived due to the subtlety, it would imply that the horns of hare also exist, but are not perceived due to subtlety. Here, we prefer the reading *viṣāṇādīnāmapi sattvapra...* as found in Poona manuscript in place of *viṣāṇavadasattvapra* as accepted by Pandeya, because the earlier fits better in the flow of the argument.

THE NON-PERCEPTION OF THAT (COSMIC MATTER) IS DUE TO ITS SUBTLETY AND NOT DUE TO ITS NON-EXISTENCE.

Your contention that it will give rise to the undesirable contingency of existence of hare's horn, etc., also is wrong.¹

Why ?

Because of possibility of some cause (of its non-perception). Even though it is not perceived on account of its subtlety, there is some reason for its existence which is not found in case of hare's horn.

What is that reason ?

The answer is :

SINCE IT IS APPREHENDED THROUGH ITS EFFECTS.

We shall propound later on how the cosmic matter is apprehended through its effects. There is, however, no effect of the hare's horn etc. Therefore the arguments are dissimilar.

आह—एवमपि प्रतिज्ञान्तरानर्थक्यम्, एकेन कृतत्वात् । सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिरित्युक्ते गम्यत एतन्नाभावादिति । तस्मात्तद्वचनमनर्थकमिति ।

Opponent : In this case also the other proposition becomes meaningless because the purpose is served by one only. When it is stated that it is not perceived due to subtlety, it is implied that it is not due to its non-existence. Therefore, its mention is meaningless.

उच्यते—न, वीतावीतपरिग्रहार्थत्वात् । एवं सिद्धे यत्प्रतिज्ञाद्वयं करोति तत् ज्ञापयत्याचार्यः वीतावीताभ्यामभिप्रेतार्थसिद्धिः । प्राक्च सौक्ष्म्यातिशयात्तदनुपलब्धिरित्याचक्षाणः प्रतिपादयति पुरस्ताद्वीतः प्रयोक्तव्य इति । एकस्मिन्च विषये द्वौ प्रयुंजानः समुच्चयेन सिद्धिं द्योतयति । किं सिद्धं भवति ? यदुक्तं तन्त्रान्तरीयैः न पृथक्प्रतिपत्तिहेतू वीतावीताविति

1. Here also we prefer the reading *viṣāṇānāmapi sattvapra...* in place of *viṣāṇavadasattvapra...*

तदिष्टमेवं संगृहीतं भवति । तत्र वीतस्य प्रतिज्ञा सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः । तस्य चावीतस्य प्रसङ्गधर्मान्तरनिवृत्तिरूपेण, नाभावात् हेतुरुभययोगी । कथम् ? यस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलभ्यमानस्य कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धिस्तस्य सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्दृष्टा । तद्यथेन्द्रियाणि । यदि पुनरस्याभावादनुपलब्धिस्स्यात्, कार्यतोऽनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः । अस्ति चेयं कार्यत उपलब्धिः । तस्मान्नाऽभावात् । न चेदभावात्, परिशेषतः सौक्ष्म्यात् तदनुपलब्धि-रिति ॥

Proponent : *No, because it is meant for the acceptance of direct inference and the inference-by-elimination. This being the case, by making two propositions the authority suggests that the object intended is established through the direct inference and the inference-by-elimination. And, stating earlier (to other proposition) that it is not perceived due to excessive subtlety the authority propounds that the direct inference should be used first. And, applying the both to the same object the authority suggests that both of them establish the object collectively.*

What is proved ?

What is stated by the other systems that the direct inference and the inference-by-elimination are not the reason of knowing some object separately is desired (by us also) and is treated here. Here, the proposition of direct inference is that it is not perceived due to its subtlety, and that of the inference-by-elimination is in the form of negating the qualities of the object undesirably involved as 'not due to its non-existence', the probans here is related to both (the types of inference).¹

How ?

The non-perception of the object, which is not directly perceived but is apprehended through the effect, is due to its

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1. Viz., the non-perception is due to its subtlety and it is apprehended through its effects.

subtlety as it is in the case of the senses. If its non-perception would have been due to its non-existence, it would involve the undesirable contingency of its non-perception through the effects also. And, its apprehension through the effect is surely there. Therefore, it is not due to its non-existence. If it is not due to non-existence, it comes to mean through elimination that it is not perceived due to its subtlety.

(The Existence of the cosmic matter inferred through its effects)

आह—किं पुनस्तत्कार्यं यद् भवान्प्रधानस्यास्तित्वे लिङ्गमाचष्ट इति ?

Opponent : What is that effect which you adduce as a sign for the existence of the cosmic matter ?

उच्यते—

महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं च ॥८॥

तद्धि महदहंकारेन्द्रियविशेषाविशेषलक्षणं कार्यं प्रधानेन विसदृशं सदृशं चेत्युपरिष्ठात्प्रवेदयिष्यामः ।

Proponent : AND ITS EFFECTS LIKE INTELLECT AND THE REST ARE SIMILAR AND DISSIMILAR TO THE COSMIC MATTER.

We shall come to know later on that the intellect, egoism, senses, the non-specific (subtle) elements⁶ and the specific (gross) elements are dissimilar as well as similar to the cosmic matter.

(Relevance of mention of dissimilarity and similarity)

आह—प्रस्तावाभावादयुक्तमेतत् । किं पुनरधिकृत्येदमुच्यते प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं च महदादि कार्यमिति ?

Opponent : It is not right because of the lack of relevance. Taking recourse to what is it stated that the effects like intellect, etc., are similar and dissimilar to the cosmic matter ?

1. In Sāṃkhya the term non-specific denotes the subtle elements and the term specific, the gross elements. The reason is given in kārikā 38.

उच्यते—व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानान्मोक्षोऽवाप्यत इत्येतत्प्रकृतम् ।
एतानि च परस्परवैधर्म्यसाधर्म्यप्रतिपत्तिमन्तरेण न शक्यानि विज्ञातु-
मित्येवमर्थमिदं प्रस्तूयते । तस्मान्नाकस्मिको वैरूप्यसारूप्योपन्यास
इति ॥८॥

Proponent : That the liberation is attained through the discrimi-
native knowledge of the manifest, unmanifest and the soul
forms the subject matter. These cannot be known without the
knowledge of the mutual dissimilarity and similarity, for this
purpose it is mentioned. Therefore, the mention of dissimilarity
and similarity is not without reason.

॥ इति श्री युक्तिदीपिकायां सप्ततिपद्धतौ द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ॥

Here ends the second discourse of the Commentary
Yuktidīpikā on the Sāmkhyakārikā